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THE SUPREME COURT, ACCOUNTING, AND
THE TAX ACCRUAL OF "TRUE" INCOME
ROBERT IANES GRAY*
A self-assessed tax, to be effective, must be determined by generally
understood or understandable rules governing the computation of the
tax base, and the results of that computation must conform with the
taxpayer's general sense of fairness. This is true of a tax on wages, on
investment income, and on business profits. It is, oddly enough, also
true of a tax on corporate income.
From one point of view, a business corporation is merely a group of
investors and employees engaged in an enterprise for profit, a very
large part of which must be paid to the federal government, not be-
cause profit, as profit, has been earned, but because profit has been
earned by a group of individuals who have been organized in a particu-
lar fashion. The heavy tax burden of the corporate privilege, collected
by a government not ordinarily granting it, is reckoned by, and to a
substantial degree is based on, the collective judgments and approxi-
mations of a number of people, primarily those charged with the duty
of estimating corporate income.'
During the life span of a sizeable business, millions (billions) of
items will have been acquired and disposed of, and more or less stan-
dard procedures will have been established internally2 to sort, record,
and summarize the vast amount of information collected in connection
with those items. The statistical problem would be a comparatively
simple one if it were convenient to wait until the end of the life of the
enterprise before determining the financial success of a business. A
comparison of the items contributed to the business by owners with
*Professor of Law, Washington and Lee University School of Law, B.S. 1931,
LL.B. 1936, Washington and Lee University; M.B.A. 1933, Harvard University;
LL.M. ig4i, J.S.D. 1942, Columbia University.
"'It is important that accountants keep in the forefront of any discussion of
income, its composite nature as the resultant of positive (credit) and negative (debit)
elements." P. GRADY, INVENTORY OF GENERALLY AccuEPT ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES
FOR BUSINEsS ENTERPRISES 411 (1965).
OCustomarily found through the chart of accounts and in the accounting
manual.
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the items distributed to them during and at the end of its activity would
afford a measure of gain or loss. But the need for information by owners,
managers, and tax collectors cannot be postponed until the conclusion
of the indefinite life of the enterprise. Daily, monthly, and quarterly
reports are frequently useful or necessary; annual reports are manda-
'tory.
The computation of annual income typically requires the resolu-
tion of three related but distinct problems. The flow of items, for ex-
ample, between a corporation and its shareholders, customers, and cred-
itors (including employees and suppliers of goods and services) must
first be evaluated and expressed in monetary terms. Those items rele-
vant to income determination must then be identified. And finally,
items so evaluated and identified must be allocated to the years for
which income is to be estimated. The first problem, that of evaluation,
frequently goes unrecognized or is treated perfunctorily, but, when it is
considered, the better procedure is to value receipts at market and dis-
bursements at cost. The second problem, that of identification, pre-
sents comparatively few difficulties: Stockholder transactions (contri-
butions and distributions), and creditor transactions (loans and pay-
ments thereon, other than premium, discount and nominal interest
paid and received) are readily eliminated at the outset, leaving for
routine consideration the items resulting from the sale of goods and
from services rendered (usually cash and receivables) and items con-
sumed in producing those goods and services (buildings, machinery, raw
materials, labor, and the like). But the third problem, that of timing,
is quite another matter.
The determination of the income of an enterprise for a particular
period is said to be "a most important task of accounting."3 Business
activity is continuous. Expenditures in one year may relate to costs
applicable to a number of years; receipts may be attributable to earlier
years, or to transactions which will not be completed until some future
time. Accounting conventions indicate the accepted bases for alloca-
tion in many situations; business judgment determines the allocation in
other instances. The process is a constantly recurring one and decisions
of varying importance are made throughout the year at all levels of the
records keeping process. Many of the most important decisions, includ-
ing those which can materially affect the income of the period, are
made at year-end, that unhappy time when, like the stopped legislative
clock, days and weeks pass into the new year before the books are
finally closed. Business income, therefore, represents the net result of
-IT. SANDERS, H. HATFIELD AND U. MooRE, A STATEmENT OF AccoUNTING PRINCIPLES
25 (1938).
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a great many decisions; it is a composite concept which requires the
application of carefully coordinated rules. The reliability of the net
estimate depends in large part upon the consistency of that applica-
tion and upon the degree of coordination.
In any industrial society the accounting process is so established, so
bound in tradition, and, in many cases, so cumbersome or overloaded,
that statutes, case law, or regulations which depart from customary ac-
counting concepts of business income will almost certainly be ignored
when minor items4 are affected and modified when major ones are in-
volved. The Supreme Court decisions relating to the accrual of taxable
income illustrate the point.
I. Taxable Income Antecedents:
An Excise Measured by Gross Receipts.
When the Supreme Court in Pollock v. Farmers Loan & Trust Co.5
held unconstitutional( the unapportioned Wilson Tariff Act of 1894f
(the 1894 Act) "so far as it levies a tax on the rents or income of real
estate," s or "on personal property, or on the income of personal prop-
erty,"9 it did not end public demand for an income tax. Many believed
that the question had not been fully presented to the Court, and that
it would be held constitutional if reenacted.
Faced with the need for additional revenue generated by the Span-
ish-American War and with the possible apportionment restriction of
the Pollock decision, Congress enacted the War Revenue Act of 189810
(the 1898 Act). Unlike the 1894 Act,'1 Section 2712 of the 1898 Act care-
fully distinguished between the subject and the measure of the tax. All
persons "carrying on or doing" designated activities were required to
'That is, minor in amount as to individual items, but often immense in the
aggregate.
'157 U.S. 429 (1895); 158 U.S. 601 (1895).
OThe Constitution provided that direct taxes "shall be apportioned among the
several States" (art. I, § 2, cl. 3), and that "No capitation, or other direct, Tax shall
be levied, unless in Proportion to the Census or Enumeration" (art. I, § 8, cl. i).
As to other taxes, the Constitution required that "all Duties, Imposts and Excises
shall be uniform throughout the United States" (art. I, § 7, cl. I).
78 Stat. 509, 553 (1894).
1157 U.S. at 583.
0157 U.S. at 6oi.
103o Stat. 448 (1898).
uSection 27 of the 1894 Act provided that there shall be "paid annually upon
the gains, profits, and income received ... by every citizen ... a tax ... on the amount
so derived..." and in like manner Section 32 of the Act provided for the collection
of a tax "on the net profits or income of all ... corporations...."
I3o Stat. 464 (1898).
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pay "a special excise tax equivalent to" a specified percentage of gross
receipts.1 3
The special excise easily withstood the challenge made in Spreckels
Sugar Refining Co. v. McClain14 that it was a direct tax. The Court
held that Section 27 of the Act was a valid exercise by Congress of its
authority under the Constitution. "Clearly the tax is not imposed on
gross annual receipts of property, but only in respect of the carrying
on or doing the business of refining sugar. It cannot be otherwise re-
garded because of the fact that the amount of the tax is measured by
the amount of the gross annual receipts."' 5 Implicit in the apparent
victory of form over substance' 6 was the propriety of the measure of the
"The 1898 Act provided in part
That every person, firm, corporation, or company carrying on or
doing business of refining petroleum, or refining sugar, or owning
or controlling any pipe line for transporting oil or other products,
whose gross annual receipts exceed two hundred fifty thousand dol-
lars, shall be subject to pay annually a special excise tax equivalent
to one quarter of one per centum on the gross amount of all
receipts of such persons, firms, corporations, and companies in their
respective business in excess of said sum of two hundred and fifty
thousand dollars.
30 Stat. 464 (1898).
"192 U.S. 397 (1904).
11d. at 411.
"At the same time, however, form did have its advantage. The legislative
technique of imposing a tax on the exercise of a privilege and of ascertaining the
value of that privilege by a related measure provided some guidance to the executive
and judicial branches of the government (and to the taxpayer) in determining the
year for which items should be included in the measure of the tax. For example,
the trial court in Spreckels concluded that amounts which had been received for
sugar after the enactment of the 1898 Act in payment for sugar sold and delivered
before the enactment should not be included in the measure of the tax. The tax
was on the business of refining sugar determined by gross receipts from that re-
fining, and only the receipts generated by the business taxed should be included
in the tax base. Spreckels Sugar Refining Co. v. McClain, iLo F. 76, 79 (C.C.E.D.
Pa. goi); accord, American Sugar Ref. Co. v. Rutan, 123 F. 979 (C.C.D. N.J. 19o3).
The trial court in Spreckels indicated, however, that a different result might have
been reached if the tax had been "directly upon" gross receipts from refining. 1o9
F. at 79-80. In like manner, the relationship between the subject and the measure
of tax also would seem to offer guidance in determining the items includable in the
measure; only items of gross receipts attributable to sugar refining should be taken
into account. But that proved to be a more difficult problem. Wharfage charges
were said to be includable (the wharves were used almost exclusively to unload raw
sugar for the refinery) but stevedoring charges were not (ships were ordinarily
unloaded by their own crews, and occasional stevedoring services performed by the
taxpayer represented compensation for ship's labor and not for refining activities).
The lower courts had included in gross receipts interest on bank deposits and
from securities, and dividends. See 1o9 F. at 79, and 113 F. 244, 246 (3d Cir. igos);
accord, American Sugar Ref. Co. v. Rutan, 123 F. 979 (C.C.D. N.J. 19o3). The
Supreme Court reversed: Interest on bank deposits "had no necessary relation to
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excise. The Court's approval (within a few years after it had decided
that a tax "upon" income from property required apportionment) of
the use of gross receipts as the measure of a tax on a business requiring
substantial amounts of capital suggested interesting possibilities. Not
only did it offer an obvious means of circumventing Pollock, but it also
offered a means of avoiding technical problems of income definition.
Having established the validity of a tax measured by gross receipts, the
Supreme Court presumably would not be inclined to object to a tax
measured by something less than gross receipts.
II. Taxable Income Antecedents:
An Excise Measured by Gross Income (Less Statutory Deductions).
By 19o9 Congress was again under heavy pressure, notwithstanding
the Pollock decision, to impose a tax on income. President Taft, how-
ever, suggested that an attempt to obtain a reversal would "not strength-
en popular confidence in the stability of judicial construction of the
constitution," and recommended (1) a tax on corporations measured
by income, and (2) the adoption of a constitutional amendment re-
moving the income tax apportionment restriction.17
As drafted, the proposed bill would tax the privilege of doing busi-
ness as a corporation measured by "income received" less "expenses
actually paid." As early as 19o9, however, it was recognized by those
having experience in such matters that any attempt to tax corpora-
tions on a cash receipts and disbursements basis would not be feasible.
Twelve leading accounting firms, in a letter to Attorney General Wick-
ersham dated July 8, 19o9, insisted that for many corporations the de-
termination of income on a cash basis was "absolutely impossible of ap-
plication," and suggested that accrual language, more appropriate to
the needs of business, be substituted. Flatly rejecting the urgent recom-
mendation, the Attorney General replied that "the bill was purposely
framed to deal with receipts and disbursements made within the year,"
that the words "actually paid" were used advisedly, and that the
"theory of the framers of the bill in this respect differs from that which
you advocate."' 8
Accordingly, "The Corporation Tax" law (the 19o9 Act),19 approv-
ed August 5, 19o9, required various business organizations, chiefly cor-
the business of refining sugar," and dividends, in the absence of a showing to the
contrary, must be assumed to be "wholly apart from the particular business in
which the holder of the stock was engaged." 192 U.S. at 417.
1TXV1 MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PREsmENas 739o.
nsFrom THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX 29-35 (R. Haig. ed. 1921).
116 Stat. ii (go9).
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porations, to pay annually "a special excise tax" in an amount "equival-
ent to" a percentage of "the entire net income received ... from all
sources during such year." Net income was to be "ascertained by de-
ducting from the gross amount of the income... received within the
year from all sources" certain cash expenditures and losses to the ex-
tent provided in the statute.2 0 Left undefined, however, was the key-
stone to the entire measure of the tax-the "gross amount of the in-
come."
Confronted with legislation which required the collection of a tax
based on accounting concepts not generally followed by corporations, 21
'Deductions included
(first) all the ordinary and necessary expenses actually paid within
the year out of income in the maintenance and operation of its
business properties, including all charges such as rentals or fran-
chise payments, required to be made as a condition to the continued
use or possession of property; (second) all losses actually sustained
within the year ... including a reasonable allowance for deprecia-
tion of property...; (third) interest actually paid within the year
on its bonded or other indebtedness to an amount of such bonded
and other indebtedness not exceeding the paid-up capital stock...;
(fourth) all sums paid... within the year for taxes ....
Section 38, 36 Stat. 11, 113 (19o9).
'Difficulties expected by accountants were great, as exemplified in the letter
to the Attorney General, referred to in text preceding footnote 18, supra:
Turning now.., to ... a large manufacturing concern producing all
kinds of finished products out of purchases of ore and other raw
materials, an accurate or even approximate statement of cash re-
ceipts and disbursements on income account is a practical impos-
sibility at any time. Cash receipts arising from sales of products
can be ascertained without much difficulty beyond requiring consid-
erable extra work. But no system of accounting can give even ap-
proximately 'the ordinary and necessary expenses actually paid
within the year out of income in the maintenance and operation
of its business and properties.' Such expenses presumably must
include the cost of the goods sold. Into this cost and following it
through the intricate accounting which has been found to be neces-
sary are raw materials actually used in manufacture, labor ex-
pended, and innumerable items of expense, which are taken into
costs as they accrue quite irrespective of the date of payment. Very
large inventories are carried of materials and supplies which are
purchased at one period, paid for at another, and used at all sorts
of times, in all sorts of quantities, and for all sorts of purposes,
mainly for manufacture into products for sale, but to a large extent
for additions to or extensions of the plant. Such as are used for
the latter purpose are not, as we understand the proposed law, a
proper deduction from gross income, and yet, long before they are
used all identity between the materials themselves and the dis-
bursements made for them has been lost. There is, in our opinion,
no method in which any statement such as that called for in the
proposed law can be prepared short of an entirely independent and
separate set of books, designed to follow each bill paid through to
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the Treasury Department could have either (i) required those corpora-
tions to rework in great detail their accounts for the year, or (2) re-
written the statute by promulgating a revision thereof in the form of
Treasury regulations. But even if the government could have quickly
devised a cash accounting system which would have satisfied minimum
standards of fairness, the first alternatives would have imposed an un-
reasonable burden on the self-assessment process and would have in-
vited widespread violations. For all practical purposes, the statute as
written was impossible to administer.22 The second alternative offered
the only feasible course for Treasury to follow; accordingly regulations
were hurriedly promulgated on December 3, 19o9, 23 and were soon
thereafter clarified and expanded by further Treasury Decisions. 24 To
accommodate the usual corporate taxpayer which kept books on an ac-
crual basis, Regulations 31 provided, among other things, that "it is
immaterial whether any item of gross income is evidenced by cash re-
ceipts during the year" or "whether the deductions are evidenced by
actual disbursements in cash." 25 Regulations 31 also contained provi-
sions relating to cost of goods sold and cost of capital assets sold. These
provisions must have been troublesome to draft. The Act defined "net
income" and the deductions were specific. It would have been awk-
ward to include in the regulations deductions not provided for by
Congress. This was not necessary, however, because "gross amount of
the income" had not been defined in the statute, and apparently the
same result was reached by defining that term. Consequently, gross
income of mercantile and manufacturing corporations was defined as
the difference between sales and cost of goods sold, cost being deter-
mined through the use of inventories, while gross income of other
corporations was defined merely as the gross revenue derived from the
operation and management of business and property. In the definition
of gross income from the sale of capital assets, however, a new element
was added: Gross income included (1) only the excess of the sales price
the ultimate destination of the materials or services covered
thereby, thus duplicating the present cost of the accounting depart-
ment and serving no useful purpose whatever. Even if such method
were adopted, it is very doubtful if it would produce the results
required with even approximate accuracy.
R. Haig, note 18 supra, at 34-35.
-See Aluminum Castings Co. v. Routzahn, 282 U.S. 92, 97 (193o).
2rRegulations 3P, T.D. 1571, 12 TREAs. DEC. INT. REV. 131 (19o9) [hereinafter
cited as Regulations 31].
54T.D. 16o6, 13 TREAs. DEC. INT. REv. 39 (1910); T.D. x675, 14 TREAS. DEC. INT.
REv. 6 (1911); T.D. 1742, 14 TRaAs. DEC. INT. R-v. 123 (1911).
'Regulations 31, Articles 2(5) and 4.
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over cost, or (2) where property had been acquired before igog, only
that part of such excess attributable to the period after 1908.26
The decision on the part of the executive branch of government
to rewrite legislative concepts of income thus permitted corporations,
not geared to cash accounting, to prepare their tax returns on the basis
of information compiled from their regular system of accounts. Indeed,
since the views of the accountants (rather than those of the Attorney
General) for a time dominated the collection machinery, it is not un-
reasonable to suppose that many corporations merely reported income
and business expenses as reflected in their respective accounting rec-
ords.
The Supreme Court in Flint v. Stone Tracy Co.27 quickly settled
threshold questions of constitutionality.2 8 The difference between the
1894 tax ("on" income) and the igog tax (on "business done in a corpor-
ate capacity" in an amount "equivalent to" a percentage of "entire net
income") was said to be "not merely nominal, but rests upon substan-
tial differences between the mere ownership of property and the actual
doing of business in a certain way." 29 The Court also made an early
start in resolving the related problems of characterizing organizations
subject to the excise and of determining when they were "carrying on
or doing business." 30 The statutory expansion of the measure of the
tax to include income from all sources (including interest from state
bonds, forbidden by Pollock3l), instead of only the income from the
business activity subject to the tax (as was the interpretation of the
1898 Act), eliminated numerous and difficult questions, and was readily
approved by the Court.
32
2nRegulations 31, Articles 2 and 5.
-7220 U.S. 107 (1911).
2The Supreme Court unanimously affirmed fourteen lower court judgments
sustaining the excise. Id.
2id. at 15o.
"°E.g., United States v. Whitridge, 231 U.S. 144 (1913); Mccoach v. Minehill R.R.,
228 US. 295 (1913); Zonne v. Minneapolis Syndicate, 220 US. 187 (1911); Eliot v.
Freeman, 220 U.S. 178 (1911).
"As Mr. Justice Field stated in Pollock
The law is also invalid in its provisions authorizing the taxation
of bonds and securities of the States and of their municipal bodies
.... These bonds and securities are as important to the performance
of the duties of the State as like bonds and securities of the United
States are important to the performance of their duties, and are as
exempt from the -taxation of the United States as the former are
exempt from the taxation of the States.
157 U.S. at 6oi.
3The Court in Stone Tracy noted that the igog Act
bears internal evidence that its draftsman had in mind language
used in the opinion in the Spreckels case, and the measure of taxa-
[Vol. XXVIII
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But matters relating to the computation of income presented the
Court with difficulties of quite a different texture. Substantial varia-
tions in the provisions of other income tax laws left the Court virtually
without judicial precedent. 33 Accounting, still in its infancy, had not
obtained such recognition or understanding as would exert much in-
fluence in legal matters as the i9o9 Act clearly demonstrated. Further-
more, Congress had made it impossible for the Court to formulate
within the framework of the Act a coherent concept of business in-
come in adopting as the basic measure of the tax an exceedingly am-
biguous term "gross amount of the income," in providing for a
shockingly incomplete schedule of ill-defined deductions therefrom,
and in limiting an important part of the analytical process to differences
between cash receipts and cash disbursements. In addition, the format
of the statute encouraged an isolated consideration of details rather
than conceptual analysis. The Act, technically imposing a tax on "net
income," required two steps to reach that amount: first, the elimination
of unspecified items from gross receipts to reach gross income; and
second, the deduction of specified items from gross income to reach
net income. Gross income therefore represented not only a rudimentary
statutory concept but also an intermediate stage in the ascertainment of
taxable income. Since income is a composite concept with highly inter-
dependent rules, any judicial definition of gross income which did not
take into account allowable deductions, or any decision which allowed
or disallowed deductions while disregarding related items of gross in-
come, would violate that concept and lead to capricious distortions in
the amount subject to tax.
Unlike the executive branch of government which had an oppor-
tunity to develop through regulations a comprehensive definition of
rules to be followed in arriving at net income, the judiciary was limited
by the adversary process to the immediate issue before the court, a
limitation which focused attention on details. Coupled with a tradi-
tion, the income from all sources, was doubtless inserted to prevent
the limitation of the measurement of the tax to the income from
business assets alone. There is no rule which permits a court to say
that the measure of a tax for the privilege of doing business, where
income from the property is the basis, must be limited to that
derived from property which may be strictly said to be actively
used in the business.
22o US. at x66.
'3The few cases arising under the Civil War income tax statutes and the various
decisions under English acts dealt with substantially dissimilar legislation and were
usually not considered helpful. See, Merchants' Loan & Trust Co. v. Smietanka, 255
U.S. 509, 521 (1921). Cf. Lynch v. Turrish, note 149, infra.
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tional reluctance to reexamine questionable (erroneous; obsolete) de-
cisions, the judiciary was particularly ill-equipped, through the inevit-
able process of trial and error, to formulate acceptable criteria for the
accrual of taxable income. Unless guidance was to be sought in Treas-
ury rulings and regulations which reflected in important respects the
views of the accounting profession, the bare bones of the grossly inade-
quate 19o9 Act afforded the only conventional source materials from
which the judiciary could work. The judicial process, limited to a
consideration of the Act, consequently offered little prospect of produc-
ing a comprehensive and acceptable concept of business income.
The Supreme Court from the outset was thus placed in a difficult
position and, understandably, failed to assume the initiative in apply-
ing orthodox income concepts. For example, in Stone Tracy the Court
had concluded that Congress could constitutionally restrict the amount
of interest expense deductible from gross income. 34 "Such details are
not wholly arbitrary." 5 Such "details," however, could be ruinous, and
while the conclusion regarding legislative power seems correct, it did
not follow that that power had been blindly exercised by Congress.
Since interest expense was normally charged against earnings, it was to
be expected that an attack through statutory construction on the dis-
allowance would continue, as it did in Anderson v. Forty-Two Broad-
way Co.3 6 In that case the Company had never earned a profit. Its paid-
up capital stock was only $6oo and its bonded indebtedness secured by
mortgages on its real estate amounted to $4,750,000. Interest payments
during the year aggregated $339,516.93 but interest (as interest) allow-
able as a deduction under the Act was only $36. Instead of a loss, the
Company's "net income" as recomputed by the Commissioner
amounted to $178,136.37 The lower courts, however, did not accept the
Commissioner's determination and held that, while not deductible as
interest, the disputed amounts were properly allowable under the pro-
vision of the Act which permitted the deduction of expenses required
to be paid as a condition to the continued use or possession of pro-
M22o U.S. at 173-74.
nZ~j at 173.
This provision may have been inserted with a view to prevent cor-
porations from issuing a large amount of bonds in excess of the
paid-up capital stock, and thereby distributing profits so as to avoid
the tax. In any event, we see no reason why this method of ascer-
taining the deductions allowed should invalidate the act.
Id.
3'239 U.S. 69 (1915).
OSee the opinion below of the Circuit Court of Appeals, 213 F. 777, 778 (2d
Cir. 1914), aff'g 209 F. 991 (S.D.N.Y. 1913).
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perty.3s The Supreme Court rejected that construction of the statute,
and confined allowable interest expense to the specific deduction pro-
vided by Congress. In reversing the lower courts, the Court stated that
the interest limitation was not an arbitrary classification and that it
was reasonable to assume
that Congress deemed that where the indebtedness does exceed
the capital it should no longer be treated as an incident, but
that the carrying of the indebtedness should be considered as a
principal object of the corporate activities, that the operations of
such a corporation are conducted more for the benefit of the
creditors than of the stockholders, and that the contribution of
the corporation to the expenses of the Government should be
admeasured with this fact in view. 39
The conclusion that the Company was operated for the benefit of
creditors failed, however, to take into account the fact that the "con-
tribution" was, to the extent of their equity, entirely at the expense
of stockholders.
Aside from the evident hardship resulting from the Court's inter-
pretation of the Act in Forty-Two Broadway, a more foreboding point
of view was reflected in that decision: It was held to be reversible error
for the lower courts to seek "a theoretically accurate definition of 'net
income' instead of adopting the meaning which is so clearly defined in
the Act itself."40 Accordingly, the Court thereafter refused to deal
comprehensively with the problems of income determination. As was
stated later by many courts in various ways and in scores of cases inter-
preting successive income tax laws, deductions were a matter of legisla-
tive grace.4 ' Having sustained in Spreckes 42 a business excise mea-
sured by gross receipts, constitutional questions regarding the power
of Congress to eliminate items from gross receipts in arriving at a
statutory tax base such as "gross income," or "net income," or some
intermediate measure were thereafter effectively foreclosed. As to ques-
tions of statutory interpretation, provisions of the statute were to be
"'See note ao, supra.
2- 39 U.S. at 73. From the standpoint of the shareholder, the measure of
corporate activity in relation to his investment demanded full recognition of the
interest expense, and the lower courts agreed. But since the Supreme Court found
the primary problem to be one of ascertaining the intent of Congress in selecting the
subject of the tax (in this case corporate activity in behalf of creditors as well as
shareholders), the measure of the tax was defined so as to effectuate that "intent."
10Id at 72.
"That conclusion also had been suggested by Mr. Justice Day who equated
"income" with "gross income" in Stone Tracy when he stated that "the measure of
the tax is to be the income, with the deduction stated .... 220 U.S. at 146.
2192 U.S. 397 (1904).
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construed, item by item, and not construed as a part of a larger con-
cept of taxable income.
Piecemeal interpretation rather than a conceptual approach to the
Act was strikingly apparent in the early depletion cases. Net income,
"so dearly defined in the Act itself," obviously could be determined
only by subtracting statutory deductions from undefined "gross amount
of the income." As noted above, 43 Treasury had attempted to provide
definitions of gross income in its rulings and regulations and from
the outset had taken the position that, in the case of the sale of a
capital asset, only that part of the receipts from a sale attributable
to gain arising after 19o8 was to be included in gross income, not the
entire selling price.44 That ruling, with a technical modification, was
then extended to mining and similar activities. Pre-19o9 appreciation
in value (the unearned increment) of ores and other deposits extracted
and sold during the year was excludable from gross income and the
actual cost of the ore in place was to be recovered as depreciation.43
In Stratton's Independence, Ltd. v. Howbert,46 Treasury interpreta-
tions, while clearly relevant, were not discussed by the Court. The tax-
payer, a British corporation profitably mining gold in Colorado, argued
that by mining it was merely changing the form of assets already owned,
that it was not thereby engaged in business for profit ("the enjoyment
"See text accompanying note 26, supra.
"Art. 2, § 5, of Regulations 81 provided that
In ascertaining income derived from the sale of capital assets,...
acquired prior to January 1, 19o9, the amount of increment or
depreciation representing the difference between the selling and
buying price is to be adjusted so as to fairly determine the propor-
tion of the loss or gain arising subsequent to January i, 19og, and
which proportion shall be deducted from or added to the gross in-
come for the year in which the sale was made.
"T.D. 1675, note 24 supra at 83-87, provided in part:
In the case of corporations whose business consists of mining...
deposits of nature (ores, coals, gas, petroleum and sundry minerals)
... In the ascertainment of net income, deduction will be allowed
for depreciation arising from exhaustion of deposits of ore, mineral,
etc., and for depreciation and obsolescence of improvements...
on the basis of the original capital investment cost of the properties
.... A further deduction will also be allowed, though not includ-
ing the same at all in the item of gross income.., for the unearned
increment represented in such properties as at January 1, igo9 ....
[determined by estimating] the fair market value at that date of
the minerals, etc., in deposit ... reduced to a unit value .... The
unit value ... attached.., to the capital assets disposed of during
any year ... should be used in determining the unearned increment
at January 1, 19o9, which may be excluded entirely from the item
of gross income ....
'8231 U.S. 399 (1913).
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of the assets and the wasting thereof are in direct proportion, and pro-
ceed pan passu"), and that it was, in effect, merely converting its
capital assets from one form (gold ore) into another (gold coins). It
followed, it was argued, that a tax on the conversion measured by the
value of the property converted would be unconstitutional, citing
Pollock. After considerable discussion the Supreme Court reached the
not unexpected answer to the first question certified by the Circuit
Court of Appeals: The taxpayer was engaged in business for profit
within the meaning of the Act. In reaching that conclusion the Court
disclaimed any intention of discussing basic income concepts (Con-
gress had not intended to enact an "income tax" law), and professed
little interest in "theoretical distinctions between capital and income."
Not being unconstitutional, "glaringly unequal," or "palpably un-
just," the Act was to be construed according to "its letter." (Notwith-
standing its disclaimer, the Court then proceeded to define "income,"
thereafter much quoted, as "gain derived from capital, from labor, or
both combined.") Alleged inequalities between mining and other busi-
nesses were not deemed to be serious; "earnings of the human brain and
hand" and income from patents were not unlike the exhaustion of ore
deposits. Income computed for the purpose of the excise "need not be
such an income as would have been taxable as such.... ." Congress de-
sired to approximate the benefit received by corporations from govern-
ment, and it was reasonable for "Congress to fix upon gross income" as
''a convenient and sufficiently accurate index of the importance of the
business transacted." The measure of the tax should be "easy of as-
certainment and simply and readily applied in practice." The Court
had "no difficulty, therefore, in concluding that the proceeds of ores
mined by a corporation from its own premises are to be taken as a part
of the gross income of such corporation." 47 Having thus answered the
second question certified by defining the term gross income, as used
in the Act, to include "proceeds of ores mined," the Court came to the
third question. Is the taxpayer, under the Act, "entitled to deduct the
value of such ore in place and before it is mined as depreciation?"
That question was answered in the negative, three Justices dissenting.
The Court took the position that the words "value of the ore in place,"
as used in the question certified, meant the difference between selling
price and all other costs of extracting and selling the ores mined, an un-
acceptable method of valuation because it would have eliminated all
taxable profits. The record, therefore, was said to preclude any inquiry
'7231 U.S. at 413-17.
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into the availability of the deduction, if the taxpayer had used some
other method of valuation.
48
The Court in Stratton's Independence followed its customary prac-
tice in dealing with excises. Finding the taxpayer to be a corporation
engaged in business for profit, the measure of the excise was of little
judicial interest.49 The Court thus failed to consider the real question
in controversy, not an abstract interpretation of undefined "gross in-
come" or of "depreciation," but whether the recovery of capital
through mining operations was to be included in the measure of the
tax. In view of the manner in which the questions were certified to
the Court and because exclusions from gross receipts and deductions
from gross income were but two approaches to the same problem, it
was to be expected that the problem would again come before the
Court, as it did soon thereafter, in three depletion cases, 50 two of which8 '
were decided on the same day that the Court reached a basically con-
18The Court held that inquiry into the matter of deductions had been prevented
by the agreed statement of facts, and by the form in which the questions had been
submitted to it for decision.
It would therefore be improper for us at this time to enter into the
question whether the clause, 'a reasonable allowance for deprecia-
tion of property, if any' calls for an allowance on that account in
making up the tax, where no depreciation is charged in practical
bookkeeping; or the question whether depreciation, when allow-
able, may properly be based upon the depletion of the ore supply
estimated otherwise than by the mode shown in the agreed state-
ment of facts herein ....
231 U.S. at 422-23.
Earlier in the opinion the Court had noted that the taxpayer had not shown
that "the so-called 'value of the ore in place,' or any other sum, was actually
charged off upon the books of the company as depreciation." Id. at 406.
Nevertheless, the Court did observe that the
valuation of the property and the amount of the depreciation were
to be determined not upon the basis of latent and occult intrinsic
values, but upon considerations that affect market value and have
their influence upon men of affairs charged with the management
of the business and accounting of corporations that are organized
for profit and are engaged in business for purposes of profit
and was clearly of the opinion that it was "quite inadmissible to estimate such
depletion as if it had been done by a trespasser, to whom all profit is denied."
Id. at 421.
"The question of whether Congress could tax a given subject was for the
Court to decide, the amount of the tax was thought to be a legislative matter. See
Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 533 (1869).
5°Goldfield Consolidated Mines Co. v. Scott, 247 U.S. 129 (1918); United States
v. Biwabik Mining Co., 247 U.S. 116 (1918). Von Baumbach v. Sargent Land Co.,
242 U.S. 503 (1917).
aBiwabik Mining and Goldfield Consolidated, note 5o, supra.
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tradictory conclusion in three other cases52 also dealing with pre-19o9
investments.
In the first of those depletion cases, the lessor, Sargent Land Co.,
owned land in Minnesota acquired prior to 1907 which was subject to
long-term mining leases requiring the lessee to pay specified amounts
per ton for ore mined. In the second, a lessee, Biwabik Mining Co.,
conducted mining operations under "precisely similar iron ore
leases."' 3 In the third, Goldfield Consolidated Mines Co. owned the ore
body which it mined. In the case involving Biwabik Mining Co., it was
stipulated that the quantity and quality of the ore body easily recover-
able during the term of the lease could be determined "with extra-
ordinary accuracy."5 4
The district court had ruled5 that the royalties received by Sargent
Land Co. did not constitute gross incomeo because "the property was
rUnited States v. Cleveland C.C. & St. L. Ry. Co., 247 U.S. 195 (1918); Hays
v. Gauley Mountain Coal Co., 247 U.S. 189 (1918); Doyle v. Mitchell Brothers Co.,
247 U.S. 179 (1918).
1'247 US. at 123.
WId. at 120.
:Sargent Land Co. v. Von Baumbach, 207 F. 423 (D. Minn. 1913); afl'd, 219
F. 31 (8th Cir. 1914).
r-The district judge stated that
It follows necessarily from the views which I have expressed that
the words 'gross income' do not mean 'gross receipts.' It is apparent
to me that gross income cannot mean gross receipts. Take, for
example, the case of a mercantile corporation. It has property at
the beginning of the year worth $iooooo. During the year it sells
at retail $io,ooo of that property at what it costs. Then in the last
month of the year, in December, it sells the entire property which
it has left for $9o,ooo, so that its gross receipts for the year are
$ioo,ooo. It cannot be possible that such a corporation is bound to
pay this tax on $io,ooo. Having sold $1oooo at no profit, it ought
not to be subject to any taxation on that. As to the $9ooooo, that
is money derived from a sale of capital assets. It is simply a change
in the form of the capital; the merchandise has become money. If
that $9o,ooo is taxable under this act, it can only be on the theory
that Congress intended to put a tax upon the transfer of pro-
perty. I do not doubt the power of Congress to do that; but, when
the court decided in the Flint Case that this was a tax upon the
privilege of doing business in a corporate capacity, it expressly
decided that it was not a tax upon the transfer of property. I will
refer again to the illustration which I have given. I will modify it
by assuming that the corporation sold the $9oooo in question for
$8o,ooo .... That $8oooo must figure in its gross receipts for that
year. But it lost $io,ooo during the year instead of making $90,000.
It is perfectly apparent from the language of the act that it was
never the intention of Congress to impose a tax upon a corpora-
tion that was not making money; it was never its intention to tax
a losing business.
207 F. at 431.
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worth no more to them in 19o9, 1910, and 1911 than it was in 19o6,
1907, and 19o8." 57 The Supreme Court reversed. Relying in part on a
decision of the Minnesota court validating similar leases of state lands,
leases which would have been void under the local constitution if held
to be sales,5 8 the Court said that the payments received "were not in
substance the proceeds of an outright sale of a mining property" but
"were in fact rents or royalties.. ." and as such came "fairly within the
term income.... ."59 As to deductions, the only one discussed was depre-
ciation. The Court reasoned that Congress must have used "deprecia-
tion of property" in the "ordinary and usual sense as understood by
businessmen" 60 and since Congress had provided an allowance (as
such) for depletion in the 1913 and 1916 Acts, the Court concluded
that depletion was not deductible under the 19o9 Act.61 The rental
payments were, therefore, fully includable in gross income without the
benefit of any allowance for the ore mined.
Biwabik Mining Co. fared no better. Treasury rulings relating to
lessees were not helpful. 62 But the propensity to use "income" in its
672o7 F. at 433.
5$State v. Evans, 99 Minn. aao, io8 N.W. 958 (19o6), was referred to below by the
Circuit Court of Appeals as "a decision ex necessitate." Judge Sanborn had rejected
the Minnesota opinion and relied on Pennsylvania cases which treated mining leases
of this type leases in name only which in fact were conveyances of ore in place. The
statement of Lord Carins in Gowan v. Christie, 3 Ex.D. 23, that "What we call a
mineral lease is really ... a sale out and out of a portion of the land" was said to
be "a perfectly accurate statement." Von Baumbach v. Sargent Land Co., 219 F. 31,
38-39 (8th Cir. 1914).
50252 U.S. at 521-22.
0OId. at 524.
It is common knowledge that business concerns usually keep a de-
preciation account, in which is charged off the annual losses for
wear and tear, and obsolesence of structures, machinery and per-
sonalty in use in the business. We do not think Congress intended
to cover the necessary depreciation of a mine by exhaustion of the
ores in determining the income to be assessed under the statute
by including such exhaustion within the allowance made for de-
predation. It would be a strained use of the term depreciation to
say that, where ore is taken from a mine in the operation of the
property, depreciation, as generally understood in business circles,
follows. True, the value of the mine is lessened from the partial
exhaustion of the property, and, owing to its peculiar character,
cannot be replaced .... It is equally true that there seems to be a
hardship in taxing such receipts as income, without some deduction
arising from the fact that the mining property is being continually
reduced by the removal of minerals. But such consideration will not
justify this court in attributing to depreciation a sense which we
do not believe Congress intended to give to it in the Act of 19o9.
Id. at 524-25.
611d. at 525.
02T.D. i6o6, note 24 supra, provided that "Corporations leasing mines and pay-
ing royalties on ore mined [are] not entitled to deduction for depreciation."
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normally understood sense persisted. 3 The Circuit Court of Appeals
sustained the action of the taxpayer in excluding from gross income
the January i, 19o9, value of ore mined during the year to the extent
that such value exceeded the royalty payments.64 The lessee's
existing interest, at the beginning of the taxing period, over
and above the royalty which he must pay, amounted to $3,o00,-
ooo; his entire interest was each year, so far as he went, con-
caFor example, the court in Biwabik Mining Co. said
[V]t is urged that we are not concerned with the meaning of 'in-
come', because, under this statute, income is not the thing taxed,
but is the measure of taxation. We do not appreciate the force of
the claimed inference. 'Income' is a word capable of definition ....
It would have been perfectly natural for Congress to decide
that the tax which it was to impose upon the privilege should
be measured either by the amount of business done thereunder
or by the proved value of the privilege. Either would have been
a logical basis for such taxation. If the former had been the
adopted theory, the tax would have been measured by total re-
ceipts, or by total sales, or by total disbursements, or by some
combination of these measurements, and any thought of profits
would have been utterly foreign to the scheme of measurement.
The most casual inspection of the laws shows that this theory was not
adopted .... It is of the essence of the law that a corporation doing
a business of $iooooo and making $5o,ooo profit, is to be taxed
per cent upon that profit, less the exemption, or $45o, while a
corporation doing a business of $io,oooooo and making no profit
is not to be taxed at all. It is clear to a demonstration that Congress
deliberately intended to tax the franchise according to its actual
value to the user, as determined by the annual profit derived there-
from, without rgard to its value as indicated by the amount of
business done.
So, too, it is urged that we should not be concerned with this
definition, because the statute itself carefully defines what the tax
upon income shall be. As has been pointed out, this idea rests upon
a dear misapprehension of the statute; the law does not purport to
do this or anything like this. The statutory computation rests upon
the assumption that we already know what income is as distin-
guished from other matters; otherwise, it would be impossible to
state that gross income which is the foundation of that statutory
computation.
242 F. at 14-15.
"The appraised value of unmined ore amounted to $0.7875 per ton, required
royalty payments were $o.3o per ton, a lump-sum payment by the lessee of 612,ooo
at the time the lease was acquired represented a cost of $o.o3885 per ton, and the
remainder of the appraised value, or $o.44865 per ton, represented the amount in
controversy. (The appraised value was apparently reflected in the books of the
company, see 247 U.S. at 121, a practice deemed prudent in view of Treasury rulings
and court comment, and one frequently adopted in the mining industry.) The
government had not appealed the trial court's allowance of cost depletion ($o.o3885).
242 F. at 13. The Supreme Court was careful to note the government's failure to
appeal the allowance of the partial deduction by the district court; "it follows
that the correctness of that ruling is not open here." 247 U.S. at x26.
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sumed and exhausted forever; ... these receipts were from the
sale of capital assets and not from income.65
The Supreme Court disagreed. It reaffirmed its view of the legal effect
of the leases expressed in Sargent Land and held that Biwabik Mining
Co. took "from the property the ore mined, paying for the privilege
so much per ton for each ton removed." The lessee was "in no legal
sense a purchaser of ore in place." 66 The full amount of the apprecia-
tion was subject to the tax.
Goldfield Consolidated Mines Co.67 had carefully followed Treas-
ury rulings,68 including (delayed) book entries to record the January
1, 19o9, value of the ore deposits which it owned and mined and had
submitted a revised return which reflected the reduction in that value
attributable to the year's mining operations (and, unlike the position
taken by the taxpayer in Stratton's Independence, had reported sub-
stantial net income, $765,38o.o2). The Supreme Court, nevertheless, in
answer to questions propounded by the lower court, summarily held
that a mining corporation may not (i) deduct from gross income any
amount whatever for depletion, or (2) deduct from gross proceeds "the
cost value of the ore in the ground," even though ascertained in strict
compliance with Treasury rules and regulations. 6
In the foregoing depletion cases, Treasury rulings and regulations
were not at any time discussed, but it seems clear that a "sale" of the
ore body would have brought into operation the exclusion provisions.
70
Earlier in Stratton's Independence the Court had conceded that "[t]he
sale outright of a mining property might be fairly described as a mere
05242 F. at 17.
01247 U.S. at 125-26.
7Goldfield Consolidated Mines Co. v. Scott, 247 U.S. 126 (igi8).
1'See note 45, supra.
ITrhe Court noted that
In view of the discussion of the nature of mining property in
Stratton's Independence ... and the application of the principles
therein laid down in the subsequent cases of Stanton v. Baltic
Mining Co., 240 U.S. io 3 [a case arising under the 1913 Act], and
Von Baumbach v. Sargent Land Co.... it is unnecessary to enter
upon further consideration of the matters disposed of in those cases.
247 U.S. at 131-32.
',In addition to royalties, Sargent Land Co. had received amounts from sales
of "stumpage, lots and lands." The case was remanded to the district court "for
further proceedings, if any are sought, upon claim of right to deduct the value of
the lands, lots and stumpage sold." Von Baumbach v. Sargent Land Co., 242 U.S.
5o3 at 525-26 (1917). The exclusion of March 1, 191 3 , value of mining property
was approved in Eldorado Coal & Mining Co. v. Mager, 255 U.S. 522 (1921), not-
withstanding the problem of valuation and the Court's earlier view of the "peculiar"
nature of the mining industry. See Reinecke v. Spalding, 280 U.S. 227 (1930) (also
dealing with March 1, 1915, value).
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conversion of the capital from land into money." 71 But neither the
absence of a technical sale of ore deposits nor the division of interests
in those deposits should have been conclusive. With a reasonable esti-
mate of recoverable tonnage of known quality, the market value of the
ore bodies could have been established and an amount per ton readily
assigned to the cost of production, including, in the case of leased pro-
perties, an apportionment of unit value between lessor and lessee, as
later Supreme Court cases clearly demonstrated.
72
Indeed, the inevitable shift in position to more orthodox income
analysis became apparent on the same day that Biwabik Mining Co. and
Goldfield Consolidated Mines Co. were decided. In Doyle v. Mitchell
Brothers Co. 73 the taxpayer, engaged in lumbering, sawmilling, and
related activities, had purchased timber lands in 190 3 from which it
had cut timber during the tax years 1909 to igi, inclusive, and in
filing its tax returns had excluded from gross receipts the pre-19o9
value of the timber cut. In sustaining the taxpayer, it was held that
the "true intent" of the Act was to measure the tax by income (which
"imports" "gain or increase"), not by the entire gross receipts from the
sale of capital assets.1 4 Consequently, even though the statute did not
1231 U.S. at 414-15.
72Various economic interests in mineral deposits were thereafter recognized.
See, e.g., Palmer v. Bender, 287 U.S. 551 (1933) (lessee-transferor of oil leases);
Bankers Pocahontas Coal Co. v. Burnet, 287 U.S. 308 (1932) (transfer of coal lands
subject to lease); Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U.S. 103 (1932) (lessor of oil and gas
properties); Lynch v. Alworth-Stephens Co., 267 U.S. 364 (1925). In Alworth-Stephens
the taxpayer had leased mining properties from the owners and thereafter sub-
leased them to others (all prior to 1913), the royalties received being substantially
in excess of those paid. The March i value of the net royalties received in 1917
was claimed as a deduction for that year, and was disallowed on the theory that
the taxpayer was not the owner of the leased properties. The Court agreed as to
ownership but disagreed with the disallowance. Under the "general rule" of the 1916
Act a deduction was allowable for the "exhaustion of the property," and it was
clear to the Court that the right of the taxpayer "to mine... the ore and reduce
it to possession" was "property." 267 U.S. at 370. Sargent Land Co. and Biwabik
Mining Co. were distinguished. The issues of depreciation and of ownership oF
the ore bodies, rather than the issue of exhaustion or depletion, were before the
Court in those cases, and the question of the property interests of lessees "such as
we have determined here, was not considered." Id. at 371. Thus, gain attributable to
years prior to March i, ig3, was excluded from taxable income regardless of
whether it was realized from the outright sale of mining property, note 70, supra,
or through the exhaustion of an ore body in the ordinary course of mining. The
Court, however, continued to consider depletion as a legislative problem. See, e.g.,
Burnet v. Thompson Oil & Gas Co., 283 U.S. 3o, 304 (1931). But see Helvering v.
Falh, 291 U.S. 183 (1934), and Reynolds v. Cooper, 291 U.S. 192 (1934), where the
Court provided relief for trust beneficiaries where the Act was silent.
'247 U.S. 179 (1918).
1 1Id. at 184-85. Earlier in the opinion the Court, in its analysis of the Act, had
said that the
legislative purpose was not to tax property as such, or the mere
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provide for a deduction for capital costs or pre-i909 value, the Court
held that the taxpayer was correct in excluding from gross receipts
"the admittedly accurate valuation as of December 31, 19o8, of the
stumpage cut and converted during the year covered by the tax."
Treasury regulations "correctly" interpreted the Act. Gross income
did not mean gross receipts, but even if it did, the same result could
be reached through depreciation. It was "a mere question of methods,
not affecting the result."7
5
Hays v. Gauley Mountain Coal Co. 76 and United States v. Cleveland
Cincinnati, Chicago & St. Louis Railway Co.,77 dealt with purchases
of shares of stock in other corporations prior to the effective date of
the 19ot9 Act and sales of such stock during taxable years after that date.
The Court in Gauley Mountain distinguished Gray v. Darlington
7 8
which had held that certain sales of government bonds were not tax-
able under the 1867 income tax legislation79 on the ground that the
language of the two statutes was "different in material particulars,"8 0
and reaffirmed the principle that only that portion of the gross re-
ceipts representing gain arising after the effective date of the Act was
to be "regarded as 'gross income.' "81 The Court then turned to the
problem of allocation. In Cleveland Railway the December 31, 1908,
value of the shares had been stipulated; the Circuit Court of Appeals
held that only the excess of the sales price over the stipulated value
should be included in gross income. In Gauley Mountain there was no
evidence of market value; the Commissioner had spread the gain rat-
ably over the entire period the shares were held, so only that part of
the gain allocated to years after 19o8 was included in gross income.
Both methods of allocating pre-19o9 gain were approved. As was
stated in Gauley Mountain, the method to be used was "a matter of
conversion of property, but to tax the conduct of the business of
corporations organized for profit by a measure based upon the
gainful returns from their business operations and property from
the time the Act took effect.
Id. at 183 .
"'Id. at 188-89. The analogy of the claim for depreciation of mining properties
was said to be "superficial," since the Court had previously held that the removal
of ores "cannot be regarded as depreciation within the meaning of the act." Id.
at 188.
"6247 U.S. 189 (1918).
77247 U.S. 195 (1918).
"82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 63 (1872).
"Act of March 2, 1867, ch. 169, § 13, 14 Stat. 478 (1867). The 1867 Act was
interpreted to tax only annual gains, with certain exceptions.
in2 47 U.S. at 191.
811d. at 193.
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detail to be settled according to the best evidence obtainable, and in
accordance with valid departmental regulations."8 2
The Supreme Court in Gauley Mountain also summarized its
strangely ambivalent position regarding the accrual of income under
the 19o9 Act. The Act "measured the tax by income received within the
year for which the assessment was levied, whether it accrued in that
year or in some preceding year while the act was in effect; but it ex-
cluded all income that accrued prior to January 1, igog, although
afterwards received while the act was in effect."18 3
Accrual accounting had been considered and rejected by the Court
earlier in McCoach v. Insurance Company of North America.84 Addi-
tions to reserves for unpaid losses (whether actually adjusted, in process
of adjustment, or resisted), not "required by law,"8 5 had been disallow-
ed as deductions from gross income in that case. Somewhat later in
Maryland Casualty Co. v. United States,8 6 the Court also disallowed
taxes, salaries, brokerage and reinsurance unpaid at the end of the year
but at the same time held that premiums received by an agent, although
not subject to attachment as the company's property while in the agent's
possession, were "received" by the insurance company.87
In the few cases decided by the Supreme Court under the 19d9 Act,
with the exception of Mitchell Brothers, Gauley Mountain and Cleve-
land Railway where Treasury regulations were followed, the Court
ignored those regulations and insisted on cash basis accounting in a
corporate world of accrual. Given two reasonable interpretations of
the Act, the Court, following the "letter" of the law, chose the one pro-
ducing the greater distortion in income and thereby reemphasized the
view expressed in Stratton's Independence that "income" within the
meaning of the 1909 Act "need not be such an income as would have
been taxable as such.' 88
Treasury, however, in its rulings and regulations had been more
pragmatic in yielding to customary business practice in its efforts to
collect the revenue. As a result, Supreme Court pronouncements were
largely of academic interest to corporations which had filed returns un-
der the 19o9 Act. In retrospect, those returns, by not reporting income
82Id.
631d. at 192.
"244 U.S. 585 (1917).
MThe 19o9 Act provided for additional deductions for insurance companies,
including "the net addition, if any, required by law to be made within the year
to reserve funds...." 36 Stat. 113.
9251 U.S. 342 (1920).
4'rhe "receipt by the agent is regarded as receipt by his principal." Id. at 347-
"212 U.S. at 416, note 46 supra,
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on a cash basis, were in violation of the law. Nevertheless, it may be as-
sumed that they were, for the most part, accepted as filed.
But even though its decisions had negligible impact upon federal
revenues collected under the 19o9 Act, the Court's approach to matters
dealing with the computation of taxable income foreshadowed unneces-
sary difficulties in the administration of subsequent income tax laws, all
of which embodied basic flaws of the 19o9 Act. The Court displayed
an astonishing indifference to the distortions which resulted from a
literal interpretation and enforcement of the Act and to customary
business practices regarding the accrual of current transactions, prac-
tices which provided the basis for the self-assessment of the tax. And
when the Court denied the accrual of pre-19o9 gain to a taxpayer en-
gaged in mining and on the same day permitted it to one engaged in
lumbering, the amounts being determined with reasonable accuracy
in both cases, the Court displayed a misdirected respect for the doctrine
of stare decisis and for easily distinguishable cases decided, not with
regard to the problem of ascertaining business income for the taxable
year, but by the application of ancient legal principles to irrelevant
questions of title. But perhaps more unfortunate was the apparent de-
termination of the Court to resolve difficult accounting (valuation)
problems by the simple expedient of refusing to consider them. In its
blanket rejection of a deduction or an exclusion because of the "pecu-
liar" nature of the mining industry, the Court not only succeeded in
provoking congressional reaction (overreaction), unresolved more than
a half century later,8 9 but it also rejected a basic practice customarily
employed in the determination of periodic income, the use of estimates
when certainty is impossible.
III. An Income Tax on Gross Income (Less Statutory Deductions):
The 1913 Act.
With the adoption of the sixteenth amendment, 0 the Chairman
of the Ways and Means Committee, Congressman Underhill, requested
Congressman Cordell Hull to prepare implementing legislation. Con-
gressman Hull, in turn, requested a committee of accountants to assist
him in the work of drafting the bill. The bill, after many changes, be-
came Section II of the Tariff Act of October 3, 191391 (the 1913 Act)
and reflected some of the suggestions of the accountants, but certainly
19See INT. REv. CODE of 1954, §§ 611-617.
®"The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from
whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several States, and
without regard to any census or enumeration."
1138 Stat. 114, 166 (1913).
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not in the manner intended. The bill, divided into two parts, one apply-
ing to individuals and the other to corporations, would impose a tax
on net income "arising or accruing" during the taxable year. Indivi-
duals would be permitted to deduct business expenses "actually in-
curred," interest "accrued and payable," and taxes "accrued within the
year." But when providing for corporations, the bill reverted to the
pattern of the 19o9 Act. Ordinary and necessary expenses, interest, and
taxes would be deductible from gross income "received" only if "paid"
within the year.
The approach, eccentric at best, to allow individuals ordinarily on
a cash basis to report income and expense when accrued but requiring
corporations, normally accruing income and expenses, to report on a
cash basis, was properly rejected by the Senate Finance Committee. Un-
fortunately, instead of revising the bill to accord with customary prac-
tice, the individual deductions were conformed with those permitted
corporations. Consequently the 1913 Act was a mixture of cash and
accrual terminology, with cash requirements prevailing in the operative
provisions. The tax was imposed on net income "arising or accruing"
during the year, but net income was to be ascertained by deducting
paid expenses from gross income received. The provisions of the 1913
Act relating to corporations, in common with those of the 19o9 Act,
were impossible to administer as written, and Treasury modifications,
similar to those issued under the earlier Act, were again necessary.92
IV. Income as a Constitutional Concept: Problems of Valuation
and of Identification.
Congress incorporated in the 1913 Act the worst features of the
gog Act, cash accounting, undefined gross income, and inadequate
deductions. It failed to include the best feature of the earlier Act, the
distinction between the subject and the measure of the tax (a distinc-
tion which had effectively sterilized Pollock), and thereby made in-
evitable the injection of questions of constitutionality in an already
impossible problem of formulating under the Act an acceptable con-
cept of business income. The ill-advised sixteenth amendment failed
to characterize "taxes on incomes," 93 and questions regarding the tax
base, formerly matters largely of congressional discretion,94 thereafter
acquired ominous constitutional overtones.
0'Regulations 33 (January 5, 1914). See, for example, Articles 96, 97, 101, 104, 105
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The decision to abandon the corporate excise as a separate revenue
measure and to provide for a tax "upon" corporate income in con-
junction with a tax "upon" individual income, aside from the needless
complexities created by interrelated provisions, made proper char-
acterization of the new tax by the Supreme Court a matter of con-
siderable difficulty, not yet resolved. Arguably the inclusion of im-
portant parts of the 19o9 Act in the corporation sections of the 1913
Act reflected not only congressional approval of earlier Treasury in-
terpretations of the provisions so reenacted, but also congressional in-
tent to enact the income tax as an excise, an expansion and reenact-
ment of the 19o'9 Act to include individuals as well as corporations.
After Pollock, Congress was careful to distinguish between the subject
and the measure of a tax when it drafted the 1898 and 19o9 Acts. Be-
fore Pollock that distinction was not explicit; the privilege taxed could
be readily inferred from the statute, and that appeared to be sufficient.
The Civil War taxes "upon" income had been collected as valid excises,
and it could be assumed that Congress intended, and the amendment
permitted, the 1913 Act to be considered in the same light. But if that
had been the intention of Congress, it should have been clearly indi-
cated in the statute.
The Constitution required that direct taxes be apportioned and
excises be uniform.95 The sixteenth amendment merely provided that
income taxes need not be apportioned. 96 Pollock declared that an in-
come tax on income from property was, in effect, a tax on property and
a direct tax, invalid for want of apportionment. And on first impression
it would seem to follow, a fortiori, that an unapportioned income tax
on property itself would be invalid. The sixteenth amendment re-
moved the requirement of apportionment of "taxes on incomes," and
a statute which taxed non-income items was not, as to those items,
relieved from apportionment by the amendment. But excises which
were measured by non-income items had a long history of judicial ap-
proval. As early as 1794 Congress had imposed an annual tax (unap-
portioned) "on" carriages which was held to be constitutional in
Hylton v. United States,97 notwithstanding the contention that it was
a direct tax. And as late as 1914 an annual tax (unapportioned) on the
"use" of foreign-built yachts had been valid in Billings v. United
States;98 and among many other taxes sustained by the Court were
wNote 6 supra.
HNote go supra.
91 U.S. (3 Dall.) 150 (1796).
"232 U.S. 261 (1914).
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excises measured by the value of property transferred (Knowlton v.
Moure),'9 by gross receipts (Speckels)oo and by gross income reduced
by designated but limited deductions (Stone Tracy).oll Both before
and after Pollock the Court had given Congress wide latitude in en-
acting excise laws.
For almost a hundred years following Hylton, direct taxes were
thought to include only capitation taxes and taxes on real estate.
Pollock broadened the category to include personal property. If the
sixteenth amendment should be considered a constitutional reversal
of Pollock (although unhappily worded if that were the purpose),
the income tax once more would be subject to the requirement of uni-
formity, and direct taxes subject to apportionment would again be
limited to capitation taxes and taxes on real property. As an excise, the
subject of the tax would ordinarily fall within the unquestioned taxing
power of Congress, and the measure of the tax, within very broad limits,
would be a matter of legislative discretion.
But if the sixteenth amendment had the effect of writing Pollock
into the Constitution and, at the same time, relieving "taxes on in-
comes" from the necessity of apportionment, income taxes would con-
tinue to be, in effect, direct taxes requiring apportionment when not
laid on income. So interpreted, form rather than substance would then
become of primary importance in fiscal legislation. For if an unappor-
tioned income tax could not include non-income items, presumably an
unapportioned tax could, if in the form of a conventional excise; and
since, in substance, the difference between a tax on income and a tax
on a privilege measured by income is imperceptible, Congress could
easily reach a desired result through careful legislative draftsmanship.
Matters of form had sufficed to distinguish the valid refining tax of
1898 and the valid corporation tax of 19o9 from the unconstitutional
income tax of 1894, and there should be no reason to suppose that
Pollock acquired a vitality from the sixteenth amendment which it did
not have before the amendment was adopted.
A third possibility, one more in keeping with the language of the
sixteenth amendment, would be to consider the amendment as a neu-
tral factor in the classification of the income tax. Pollock would stand
or fall on its own merits. Whether direct or indirect, a tax on an item
which the Supreme Court deemed to be income need not be appor-
tioned. Other constitutional questions regarding taxes would be decided
without reference to the amendment. So construed, the unhappy deci-
178 u.s. 41 (190o).
10192 US. 397 (1904).
"1220 U.S. 107 (1911).
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sion to follow the route of constitutional amendment recommended by
President Taft merely postponed straightforward action by Congress
which would, sooner or later, directly challenge Pollock, notwithstand-
ing the asserted fear that such action would "not strengthen popular
confidence in the stability of judicial construction of the constitu-
tion.'u 02 Judicial restraints on federal fiscal power imposed by a
sharply divided Court in Pollock, restraints subsequently diluted to
matters of form rather than substance, obviously invited legislative en-
croachment.
The effect of the sixteenth amendment upon the fiscal power of
Congress was considered at some length by Mr. Chief Justice White in
Brushaber v. Union Pacific Railroad Co.10 3 and in Stanton v. Baltic
Mining Co.104 In much the same way that it had first considered the
19o9 Act in Stone Tracy'0 5 the Court in Brushaber summarily rejected
a great many arguments against the 1913 Act. Basic constitutional
validity was firmly established, and a number of provisions of the Act
were expressly upheld, including a limitation on the amount of in-
terest deductible by corporations. 106 The limitation on the amount of
deductible interest was again considered and declared valid in Tyee
Realty Co. v. Anderson,o7 decided the same day as Baltic Mining
which sustained a limitation on the depletion deduction,10s new in the
1913 Act, over the taxpayer's contention that the limitation deprived it
of some four-fifths of its depletion for the year. 0 9
In discussing constitutional limitations on congressional fiscal
power, the Chief Justice said that in the field of income taxes the
power of Congress was "complete and plenary.""' 0 The amendment did
not confer any new power of taxation"' but "simply prohibited" that
power "from being taken from the category of indirect taxation to
which it inherently belonged" and placed "by a mistaken theory" in
1'Note 17 supra.
"3240 U.S. 1 (1916).
1424o U.S. 103 (1916).
1"5220 US. 107 (1911).
"'OThe interest deduction permitted a corporation was limited to "interest
accrued and paid within the year on its indebtedness to an amount of such indebt-
edness not exceeding one-half of the sum of its interest bearing indebtedness and its
paid-up capital stock." Section 1I(G)(b) (third), 38 Stat. 173 (1913).
"0'240 U.S. 115 (1916). "The tax does not rest upon income in the true sense of
the word." Id. at 116.
"'Depletion was limited to "5 per centum of the gross value at the mine of the
output for the year." Section II(G)(b) (second), 38 Stat. 172-73 (1913).
"'Computed on the basis of March 1, 1913, value of the ore.
1'24o U.S. at 112.
'-24o U.S. at 17; 240 U.S. at 112. See text accompanying notes xi6 and 139 infra.
See also note 143.
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the category of direct taxation.112 The suggestion that an income tax
should be classified as a direct tax was flatly rejected, since the income
tax, if a direct tax, would be exempt not only from the requirement of
apportionment but also from the rule of uniformity, "thus giving
power to impose a different tax in one State or States than was levied
in another State or States." 1 3 Not being a direct tax, there was no
difficulty, therefore, in concluding, as the Court did in Baltic Mining,
that an income tax under the sixteenth amendment could include "the
gross product of the working of the mine." 1 4 Furthermore, "indepen-
dently of the effect of the operation of the sixteenth amendment," it
was settled in Stratton's Independence "that such a tax is not a tax upon
property as such because of its ownership, but a true excise levied on the
results of the business of carrying on mining operations.""15
The sixteenth amendment accordingly was said to restore the in-
come tax to the category of indirect taxes to which "it inherently be-
longed." And both Baltic Mining and Tyee Realty (where items of
gross income were not in question) demonstrated that Congress had
considerable latitude in defining net income. But more important, the
sixteenth amendment was, in effect, declared redundant at least so far
as corporate income taxes were involved because an income tax, ascer-
tained by subtracting from gross income such deductions as Congress
might provide, was declared to be a "true excise" on business activity
despite the fact that the 191 3 Act, unlike the 19o9 Act, imposed a tax
"upon" income and did not, in so many words, specify the privilege
taxed.
In emphasizing the point that the sixteenth amendment merely re-
established the income tax as an indirect tax, the Chief Justice in
Baltic Mining unfortunately overstated his position. Notwithstanding
the clear authority of Congress to tax "incomes from whatever source
derived, without apportionment," the Chief Justice volunteered the
observation that "the Sixteenth Amendment conferred no new power
of taxation."'116
2-24o U.S. at 112-13.
in 2 40 U.S. at 12.
in 2 4 0 U.S. at 112-14.
"id. at 114. A more limited view was expressed in Willcuts v. Bunn, 282 U.S.
216, 227-28 (1931): In sustaining the income tax on gain from the sale of muncipal
bonds, Mr. Chief Justice Hughes, writing for a unanimous Court, stated that the
"federal income tax acts cover taxes of different sorts [citing Brushaber and Baltic
Mining .... The tax upon profits made upon purchase and sales is an excise."
See also Morrissey v. Commissioner, 296 U.S. 344, 355 (1935).
2'02 4o U.S. at 17; 240 U.S. at 112. See text beginning at note 139 infra.
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dIn Baltic Mining the tax was on receipts (reduced by such deduc-
tions as were permitted by Congress) which contained a possible ele-
ment of gain. That element of gain was less apparent in the stock divi-
dend cases. Unlike the 1913 Act which failed to define dividends,
1 7
the 1916 Act expressly included stock dividends in taxable income,118
and the later legislation was enacted before the stock dividend con-
troversy under the earlier Act was argued before the Supreme Court in
Towne v. Eisner.1 9 The problem in Towne, nominally one of statu-
tory interpretation, was considered in the shadow of that congressional
action. Relying heavily on its decision in a case dealing with life tenants
and remaindermen,120 the Court held the 5o% stock dividend declared
out of pre-1913 surplus to be nontaxable. The shareholder was "no
richer" and the declaring corporation "no poorer" after the distribution
"than they were before." And even if additional advantage had been
received, it was de minimis.121 Expressed somewhat differently, the stock
dividend was said not to be a "dividend;" it was, in effect, nothing
more than a stock "split up,"'2 2 a conclusion not unlike that reached
today in conventional accounting analyses dealing with relatively large
stock distributions.
123
The constitutional question reached the Court some two years
later in Eisner v. Macomber.2 4 The Court, assisted by the Government's
concession that the "mere issue of a stock dividend makes the recipient
no richer than before,' 2 5 reverted to the overall valuation analysis of
2Net income included "dividends, securities,... and income rerived from any
source whatever." Sections II(B) and II(G)(a), 38 Stat. 166, 167, 172 (1913).
raThe 1916 Act provided that net income shall include "dividends," and
"dividends" shall be held to mean any distribution out of earnings and profits
accrued since March 1, 1913, "whether in cash or in stock of the corporation ...
which stock dividend shall be considered income, to the amount of the cash value."
Sections 2(a) and 1o, 39 Stat. 756, 757, 766 (1916).
1"245 U.S. 418 (1918).
"'Gibbons v. Mahon, 136 U.S. 549 (1890).
"2If the taxpayer "gained any small advantage by the change. it certainly was
not an advantage of $417,450, the sum upon which he was taxed." 245 U.S. at 426.
"'245 U.S. at 427. The lower court noted that capital stock was increased "from
$3,000,000 to $4,50o,ooo, par." 242 F. 702, 704 (S.D.N.Y. 1917).
"'See, for example, Accounting Research Bulletin No. 43, Chapter 7, Section
B, reprinted in P. GRADY, INVENTORY OF GENERALLY ACCEPTED ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES
FOR BUSINESS ENTERPRISES 2o6-08 (1965).
m252 U.S. 189 (192o). See also Palmer v. Commissioner, 302 U.S. 63 (1937)
(dealing with stock distributions as dividends); Miles v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co.,
259 U.S. 247 (1922) (dealing with stock rights); LaBelle Iron Works v. United
States, 256 U.S. 377 (1921) (dealing with stock dividends under the excess profits tax).
"'252 U.S. at 214. The concession was made in connection with the argument
that the issuance of stock certificates reflecting accumulated corporate gains was
an appropriate time to tax those gains to the shareholders, citing Collector v.
Hubbard, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 1 (1870), which involved the provision of the 1864
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the earlier decision, and reiterated the view that a stock dividend took
nothing from the property of the corporation and added nothing to
that of the shareholder26-it was "merely bookkeeping." Pollock pro-
hibited an unapportioned tax on income from property. The sixteenth
amendment adopted that interpretation; it merely removed the neces-
sity of an apportionment of taxes laid on income. Apportionment of
taxes on capital was still required. It was thus essential "to distinguish
between what is and what is not 'income'," and to apply the distinc-
tion "according to truth and substance, without regard to form."'127
That conclusion made it impossible to consider the tax on stock divi-
dends as a valid excise, 128 because the dual aspect of an indirect tax
had been recognized as early as Hylton v. United States,129 and a strict
insistance on "truth and substance, without regard to form," would
destroy most excises.
A perplexing mixture of statutory and constitutional interpretation
appeared in the Court's decision in Edwards v. Cuba Railroad Co.1s3
in which it was held that subsidies paid by the Cuban Government to
the taxpayer during the years 1911 to 196, inclusive, were not "in-
come." The "no richer than before" test, not referred to in the opinion,
was obviously inappropriate because the assets of the taxpayer were
clearly increased by the amount of the subsidies received. Instead, the
Court, disagreeing with the Government's contention that the sub-
sidies were advance payments for transportation services later to be
performed by the taxpayer,' 3 ' said that the payments were not income
because they were in partial reimbursement of capital expenditures,
not for
the payment of dividends, interest or anything else properly
income tax law which taxed shareholders on their respective shares of corporate earn-
ings, whether distributed or not, a case said to be inconsistent with Pollock and not
to be followed. 252 U.S. at 218.
mSee Helvering v. Sprouse, 318 U.S. 604 (1943); Koshland v. Helvering 298 U.S.
441 (1936). See also Helvering v. Gowran, 302 U.S. 238 (1937); Helvering v. Griffiths,
318 U.S. 371 (1943). For congressional reversal of position compare Sections 2(a)
and to of the 1916 Act, note i18 supra, with INT. RFv. CoDE of 1954, § 305.
L"252 U.S. at 206.
m2"le validity of the tax as an excise was discussed in neither the majority nor
in the minority opinion.
2-ONote 97 supra. Mr. Justice Chase said that "I believe some taxes may be both
direct and indirect at the same time. If so, would congress be prohibited from laying
such a tax because it is partly a direct tax?" 1 U.S. (a Dall. at 174) at 152.
1 268 U.S. 628 (1925), aff'g Cuba R.R. v. Edwards, 298 F. 664 (S.D.N.Y. 1921)
(holding that the subsidy payments were not "income in any practical business
sense." 298 F. at 666).
13268 U.S. at 631.
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chargeable to or payable out of earnings or income. The subsidy
payments taxed were not made for services rendered or to be
rendered. They were not profits or gains from the use or opera-
tion of the railroad .... 132
Mitchell Brothers had referred to "income" as used in the 19o9 Act
as conveying "the idea of gain or increase arising from corporate acti-
vities,"' 33 and the subsidies clearly represented increases in assets arising
from corporate activities; but even if that were not the case, the i909 Act
expressly included income from all sources. The measure of the excise
was not limited to income from corporate activity subject to the tax,
L34
and the sixteenth amendment contained similar language equally
broad,135 as did the 1913 and 1916 Acts.136 Furthermore, the meaning of
"income" in the 19o9 Act was said by the Court "not to be distinguished
from" the meaning of "income" as used in the 1913 and gi6 Acts.
137
Nevertheless, the Court concluded that subsidies "were not profits or
gains from the use or operation of the railroad, and do not constitute
income within the meaning of the sixteenth amendment."'13 8 Presum-
ably Congress had not intended to tax subsidies under the 19o9 Act; it
could not under the 1913 and 1916 Acts.
Constitutional objections were more than a substitute for statu-
tory interpretation in National Life Insurance Co. v. United States139
which involved the computation of taxable net income of insurance
companies. Section 245 of the 1921 Act140 provided, among other things,
for a deduction from gross income of (i) tax-exempt interest and (2)
4% of certain reserve funds, the latter deduction being reduced, how-
ever, by the amount of the former. Inasmuch as an insurance company
with tax-exempt interest would have the same taxable net income as
an otherwise identical insurance company receiving fully taxable in-
terest, the Court declared the reserve fund adjustment invalid. "Con-
gress has no power purposely and directly to tax state obligations by
refusing to their owners deductions allowed to others."'
141
"-268 U.S. at 633. Compare Brown Shoe Co. v. Commissioner, 339 U.S. 583
(1950) (assets received from community groups to locate or expand plants represent
capital contributions which are depreciable) with Detroit Edison Co. v. Commis-
sioner, 319 U.S. 98 (1943) (extension of taxpayer's facilities paid for by customer
not depreciable).
m247 U.S. at 185.
'"Note 32 supra.
"Note 9o supra.
mIn both Acts the tax was upon income "from all sources."
" 268 U.S. at 631.
'191d. at 633.
1'277 U.S. 508 (1928).
1042 Stat. 261 (1921).
"1277 U.S. at 522.
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Stone Tracy142 had sustained the inclusion of tax-exempt interest
in the measure of the go9 corporate excise, and William E. Peck & Co.
v. Lowe,143 after the Amendment, had upheld the tax on income from
exports. Yet Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co.144 still governed
some aspects of a tax described as an "income tax." Although the
Court was soon thereafter to begin its retreat from the doctrine of
derivative immunity,145 for a time the express constitutional power
of Congress "to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from whatever
sources derived, without apportionment" was not so construed. The
power did not extend to a tax on the income from state bonds.
In its decisions in Tyee Realty and Baltic Mining the Supreme Court
had upheld an income tax on capital. 146 When a taxpayer operated at a
loss, as in Forty-Two Broadway,147 the disallowance of a proper
charge against revenue could produce statutory "net income" even
though the net assets of the taxpayer actually decreased during the
year as a result of those operations. The exaction of an income tax
further accelerated that decrease. In no sense could the tax be con-
sidered other than a "contribution" to the Government of a part of the
'l Text accompanying note 27 supra.
143247 U.S. x65 (s918). The Court said that the sixteenth amendment had "no
real bearing" on the question of whether the tax on income from exports violated
the constitutional prohibition against federal taxation of "articles exported from
any state." Art. I, § 9, cl. 5. As had been pointed out in Brushaber and Baltic
Mining, the amendment did not extend the taxing power "to new or excepted
subjects." 247 U.S. at 172. But aside from the sixteenth amendment, a nondiscrimina-
tory income tax on the profits of exportation was not laid on "articles in course
of exportation," and was not, therefore, "laid on property while being exported."
247 U.S. at 174. See also Barclay & Co. v. Edwards, 267 U.S. 442 (1924); National
Paper 8: Type Co. v. Bowers, 266 U.S. 373 (1924).
"Note 5 supra.
"' iThe Court upheld the tax on the gain from the sale of state bonds in Willcuts
v. Bunn, 282 U.S. 216 (1931) and sustained in Denmon v. Slayton, 282 U.S. 514 (1931),
the statutory disallowance of a deduction because of the receipt of tax-exempt
interest,--the deduction of interest on indebtedness incurred or continued to pur-
chase or carry tax exempt obligations. Section 214(a)(2) of the 1921 Act, 42 Stat. 227
(1921). It was a permissible classification to prevent tax avoidance.
The retreat thereafter gained momentum in Helvering v. Mountain Producers
Corp., 303 U.S. 376 (1938), Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U.S. 405 (1938), and Graves
v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466 (1939).
uOA tax on gross income would frequently result in the taxation of capital,
because there is no necessary relationship between gross income and income.
Obviously many businesses with gross income operate at a loss, frequently leading
to insolvency, yet the Court has repeatedly said that Congress has the power to tax
gross income. See, e.g., Deputy v. DuPont, 308 U.S. 488, 493 (1940); cf. White v.
United States, 305 U.S. 281, 292 (1938); Helvering v. Winmill, 305 US. 79, 84 (1938);
Helvering v. Independent Life Ins. CO., 292 U.S. 371, 381 (1934); New Colonial Ice
Co. v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 435, 440 (1934)-
" TNotes 36 and 37 supra.
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taxpayer's capital. Nevertheless, the Court sustained various provisions
which could make that result possible under the sixteenth amendment.
Yet Macomber held a tax on a stock dividend invalid because it was
an unapportioned tax on capital, and in so deciding the Court in-
sisted (without discussing Tyee Realty and Baltic Mining) that effect
must be given to matters of substance rather than form. It followed
from Macomber that an income tax on the beneficial use by a taxpayer
of his own property would also require apportionment.' 48 The Court
thus recognized two inconsistent views of the sixteenth amendment.
When dealing with general business activity, the income tax was valid
as an excise, but, when specific transactions were considered a direct
tax analysis was adopted. As a result of Tyee Realty and Baltic Mining,
a taxpayer operating a business at a loss (which obviously made him
poorer than before) was subject to an unapportioned income tax, while
under Macomber and Cuba Railroad a taxpayer receiving a stock divi-
dend (which made him neither richer nor poorer than before), or sub-
sidies (which made him richer than before) was not. Under either view,
the Court made it abundantly clear that whatever the standards might
be, the sixteenth amendment did not require the computation of in-
come in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles.
V. Income as a Judicial Concept: Transactions, Corporations and
Annual Accounting.
The failure of the Supreme Court to reconcile its views of the proper
classification of the income tax under the Constitution, a matter within
its particular province, presaged greater vacillation in less familiar areas
where constitutional questions were not in issue. For example, the
problem of allocating income to periods before and after March i,
1913, should have been an easy one. The Court, however, solved it in
ways which led to conflicting precedents, precedents later preserved by
inadequate distinctions and applied in the areas of annual accounting
and closely controlled corporations with unsettling results.
'48See Helvering v. Independent Life Ins. Co., 292 U.S. 371 (1934); Rockford
Life Insurance Co. v. Commissioner, 292 U.S. 382 (1934). These cases dealt with the
disallowance of real estate expenses attributable to property owned and occupied
by the taxpayer. By way of dictum the Court in Independent Life Insurance Co.
said that
If the statute lays taxes on the part of the building occupied by
the owner or upon the rental value of that space, it cannot be sus-
tained, for this would be to lay a direct tax requiring apportion-
ment .... The rental value of the building used by the owner does
not constitute income within the meaning of the Sixteenth Amend-
ment.
292 U.S. at 378-79.
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The "no richer than before" test used in Towne was applied by the
Court shortly thereafter in Lynch v. Turrish.149 In this case the tax-
payer received a liquidating dividend in 1914 following the sale of tim-
ber lands by the corporation making the distribution.150 All apprecia-
tion in value of the taxpayer's shares of stock, as well as the corpora-
tion's assets, had taken place prior to March 1, 1913.151 The conversion
of the corporation's property and of the taxpayer's stock (real property
to personal property; stock to cash) represented, in effect, sales of assets
without gain attributable to a taxable period after March 1, 1913, and
the case could have been decided on that ground without further dis-
cussion. 15 2 Instead, the Supreme Court expressly approved the reason-
ing of the lower court which had declared the liquidating dividend to
be tax-free on the authority of two decisions interpreting specific pro-
visions contained in the 1864 and 1867 income tax laws, provisions not
present in the 1913 Act: (i) That the March i value of the corporate
assets had accrued to the shareholders before the effective date of the
1913 Act, so the corporation's distribution of the proceeds from the
sale of those assets did not result in taxable gain, citing Collector v.
Hubbard,1 5 3 a case involving the 1864 law which expressly provided
for the inclusion in the taxable income of a shareholder of his portion
of corporate profits, whether distributed or not, 5 4 and (2) that gain
on the sale of assets which had appreciated in value over a number of
years was not taxable in the year of realization, the Court citing Gray v.
Darlington,55 a case which the Court had refused to follow only two
weeks earlier in Gauley Mountain,56 pointing out material differences
in the language of the 1867157 and 19a9 Acts (differences which were
also present with respect to the 1913 Act).
1"247 U.S. 221 (1918).
5The original transaction was in the form of an option to purchase all of the
stock of the corporation from shareholders. At the request of the option holder the
transaction was revised to provide for a sale by the corporation of its assets, followed
by liquidation. Id. at 223-24.
m The facts were admitted on demurrer. 247 U.S. at 222.
"-'See Hellnich v. Hellman, 276 U.S. 233 (1928). The Court concluded that
assets received in the liquidation of a corporation should be treated as amounts
received from the sale of stock, not as a dividend. For a discussion of the March i
problem by Mr. Justice Cardozo, see United States v. Safety Car Heating & Light-
ing Co., 297 U.S. 88 (1936).
1;79 US. (12 Wall.) 1 (1870). Within two years the Supreme Court was to declare
Hubbard overruled by Pollock. Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 218 (19g).
'"Act of June 3o, 1864, ch. 173, § 117, 13 Stat. 281.
182 U.S. (15 Wall.) 63 (1872). Darlington was also declared inapplicable to later
income tax statutes in Merchants' Loan & Trust Co. v. Smietanka, 255 U.S. 509 (1921).
= Note 76 supra.
2-7Te.xt accompanying note 79 supra.
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In Southern Pacific Co. v. Lowe' 5s and in Gulf Oil Co. v. Lewel-
lyn,150 the Court again held that distributions of pre-March 1, 1913,
earnings were not taxable to shareholders. Again, as in Turrish, the
Court did not rest its decisions on the generally recognized and easily
understood principle that gain which had accrued before the effective
date of the 1913 Act was not taxable under that Act. In Southern Paci-
fic dividends had been declared out of pre-1913 surplus of a wholly-
owned subsidiary and distributed to its parent corporation through
intercompany balances. The Court took the unfortunate position that
the distribution was "only constructive, being carried into effect by
bookkeeping entries."'160 The Court said that surplus accrued prior to
1913 represented "capital"-capital which had accrued to the parent
corporation prior to the 1913 Act and "underwent nothing more than
a change in form when the dividends were declared."' 61 In Gulf Oil,
the dividends also had been declared out of pre-1913 surpluses of
wholly-owned subsidiary companies and distributed through the trans-
fer of intercompany balances. The Court again ignored the pre-March
1 aspect of the problem, comparing the overall effect of the distribution
upon the position of the shareholder. The Court held that the parent
corporation, "disregarding the forms gone through," was, as in Towne,
"no richer than before."' 62 The dividends were not taxable.
The use of the "no richer than before" test in determining whether
dividends were taxable, basic to the decisions in Turrish and Southern
Pacific (with reinforcement by a disregard of the corporate entity)1 3
of necessity was subsequently abandoned. The recipient shareholder's
equity in a corporation is reduced by the amount of a dividend, regard-
less of when the corporate income was earned. But instead of following
'0247 U.S. 330 (1918).
'50248 U.S. 71 (1918).
210247 U.S. at 333.
101247 U.S. at 335-36.
While the two companies were separate legal entities yet in fact,
and for all practical purposes they were merged, the former being
but a part of the latter, acting merely as its agent and subject in all
things to its proper direction and control. And besides, the funds
represented by the dividends were in the actual possession and con-
trol of the Southern Pacific as well before as after the declaration
of its dividends.
Id. at 337. Both companies, however, maintained their separate identity for other
federal tax purposes, including the filing of separate tax returns. See National
Carbide Corporation v. Commissioner, 336 U.S. 422, 43o n.8 (1939).
162248 U.S. at 72.
161The entity was disregarded in Southern Pacific in the sense that accumulated
earnings of the subsidiary corporation were deemed to have accrued to the parent;
the language in the opinion, however, was much broader than that point required.
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the lead of Congress'0 4 in distinguishing between distributions out of
income earned before March 1, 1913, and distributions out of income
earned after that date, the Court adopted a man-in-the-street test when
it decided Lynch v. Hornby 65 and Peabody v. Eisner,166 decisions
handed down the same day as Turrish and Southern Pacific. In Horn-
by, a dividend which was "extraordinary in amount," paid in sub-
stantial part from appreciation accrued before, but realized by the
distributing corporation after March 1, 1913, was held to be fully tax-
able under the 1913 Act as was the "extra" dividend in Peabody, a divi-
dend which was paid in cash and in shares of stock of another corpora-
tion (Baltimore 9& Ohio common and preferred stock), the entire value
of which was taxable even though that dividend was in excess of the
earnings accumulated subsequent to March 1, 1913. The Court in
Hornby, recognizing that the overall problem was not unlike that of
Towne, said that the receipt of a dividend, extraordinary in amount,
"might appear upon analysis to be a mere realization in possession of
an inchoate and contingent interest that the stockholder had in a
surplus of corporate assets previously existing."' 67 Noting that Con-
gress had excluded such distributions when it enacted the 1916 Act,16
the Court nevertheless held that gain accrued before March 1, 1913,
was subject to tax under the 1913 Act, if realized in the form of a divi-
dend, because dividends were, "in the ordinary sense of the word," in-
come, and that Congress, after the adoption of the sixteenth amend-
ment, could without apportionment tax "everything that became in-
come."'0s In the space of a single day the Court thus reached basically
inconsistent conclusions based on two astonishing (and subsequently
embarrassing) lines of reasoning when it decided on the one hand that
income accrued prior to March 1 was taxable, if distributed as an extra-
ordinary dividend, but was not taxable on the other hand if distributed
by a subsidiary to its parent corporation or if distributed in liquidation.
"'Congress had earlier made clear its intention in the 1916 Act when it de-
fined dividends to mean distributions out of earnings and profits accrued since
March 1, 1913. See note ii8 supra.
2'5247 U.S. 339 (1918) •
10247 U.S. 347 (1918).
m247 U.S. at 344.
1uThe Court rejected the contention that the legislative history of the 1916
Act indicated that the definition of dividends excluding pre-March 1 earnings
was "declaratory," and deemed it "more reasonable to regard the change as a con-
cession to the equity of stockholders... in view of constitutional questions that
have been raised." Id. at 345-46.
10Id. at 344. Corporate distributions later considered by the Court required
more than superficial comment. See Marr v. United States, 268 U.S. 536 (1925);
Weiss v. Steam, 265 U.S. 242 (1924), note 207 infra; Cullinan v. Walker, 262 U.S.
134 (1923); Rockefeller v. United States, 257 U.S. 176 (1921); United States v.
Phellis, 257 U.S. 156 (192).
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From the point of view of the man-in-the-street, the entire gain
from the sale of capital assets, acquired before but sold after March 1,
could be said to be income "in the ordinary sense of the word," whereas
a persistent argument of taxpayers, referred to favorably in Statton's
Independence,170 was that a mere conversion of a capital asset into cash
did not increase the taxpayer's wealth and, hence, did not generate
taxable income. That persistent view was again advanced by the tax-
payer in Merchants' Loan & Trust Co. v. Smietanka'71 and was per-
functorily rejected by the Court, as it had been under the 19o9 Act in
Gauley Mountain.172 The Court again distinguished Gray v. Darling-
ton, and Turrish was limited to its facts. In Smietanka the Court pro-
fessed to be "entirely satisfied" with the definition of the word "in-
come," approved in Macomber173 a definition "believed to be the
commonly understood meaning of the term."17 4 It did not comment on
the middle ground taken by the Commissioner in assessing tax only
on that part of the gain from the sale of assets attributable to the per-
iod following February 28, 1913, notwithstanding its earlier approval
in Hornby of a tax on the entire amount of the extraordinary dividend
paid from gain accrued prior to March 1.
Treasury regulations under the 19o9 Act, approved in Mitchell
Brothers,175 provided that gain or loss from the sale of a capital asset
("the difference between the selling and buying price") was to be "ad-
justed so as to fairly determine the proportion of the loss or gain aris-
ing subsequent to January i, 19o9 . " 176 The net result of the entire trans-
action having been ascertained, gain or loss was allocated between non-
taxable and taxable years either by reference to the January i, 19o9,
value 77 or on a straight-line method when the January i value was not
available. s7 8 Congress thereafter in the 1916 Act recognized the exclu-
sion of pre-March i gain or loss, but not in the manner earlier provided
by Treasury regulations. Instead of allocating the gain or loss of the
entire transaction, the Act provided that the fair market value of the
property on March 1, 1913, if acquired before that date, "shall be the
ro'2ai U.S. 399 (1913); see text accompanying notes 46 and 70 supra.
1' 255 U-S. 509 (1921
1T2Note 76 supra.
'7"Income may be defined as the gain derived from capital, from labor, or
from both combined, provided it be understood to include profit gained through
a sale or conversion of capital assets...." 252 U.S. at 2o7, citing Stratton's Inde-
pendence, Ltd. v. Howbert, 231 U.S. 399, 415 (1913).
174255 U.S. at 519.
I-'Note 73 supra.
1 7Regulations 31, Article 2(5).
1-United States v. Cleveland, C., C. & St. L. R.R., 247 U.S. 195 (1918).
1-8Hays v. Gauley Mtn. Coal Co., 247 U.S. 189 (1918).
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basis for determining the amount" of such gain or loss.1 79 Presumably
the difference between the value of the property on that date and its
selling price would determine the amount taxable or deductible.
When the March i value fell somewhere between original cost and
final selling price, it made no difference which approach was applic-
able, the earlier Treasury regulations or the approach of Congress
in the 1916 Act. Taking either approach, taxable gain or deductible loss
would be the same amount, whether computed by allocating gain or
loss from the entire transaction (the difference between original cost
and selling price), as suggested by Regulations 31, or by treating the
March i value as capital (the difference between March 1 value and
selling price, not requiring allocation), as the language of the 1913 Act
would seem to require.
If, however, the March i value was either higher or lower than
both purchase price and selling price, the choice of approach made a
great deal of difference. The distinction between the accrual of gain or
loss on March 1, 1913, and the allocation of gain or loss from a trans-
action extending over a period of years became acute. Gain or loss ac-
crued on March i did not represent a closed business transaction and,
although accepted as a matter of course when dealing with such matters
as inventories, accrual could produce profit or loss for the period follow-
ing March i substantially greater than that realized from the transaction
as a whole and thereby produce a so-called paper profit or loss. The
Supreme Court, under such circumstances, with the assistance of a con-
fession of error by the Government, 8 0 declined to accept the implica-
tions of accrual accounting. In Goodrich v. Edwards'8 ' and in Walsh
v. Brewster,8 2 the Court held that where the cost of assets purchased
prior to March 1, 1913, exceeded the March 1 value, the subsequent sale
""Sections 2C) (gains of individuals), 5(a)(4) (losses of individuals), and (io)
(corporations). 39 Stat. 756-57 (1916). The 1918 Act combined the gain and loss
provisions in Section 202(a), 40 Stat. 1057 (1919).13Goodrich v. Edwards, 255 U.S. 527, 534 (1921).
3i 2 5 5 U.S. 527 (1921). Two transactions were before the Court. The first pre-
sented no difficulty because the selling price of the asset exceeded March 1 value and
that value exceeded cost, so that only the increase after February 28, 1913, was
taxable. But in the second transaction, stock acquired in 1912 for $291,6oo.oo with
a March 1 value of only $148,635.5o was sold in 1916 for $269,346.25; appreciation
subsequent to the adoption of the sixteenth amendment was not taxable because
the entire transaction did not result in gain.
1'255 U.S. 536 (1921). Bonds purchased in 1894 for $191,ooo had declined in
value to $151,845 on March i, 1913, and were sold in 1916 for $191,000. Other bonds
purchased in 1902 and 19o3 for $231,3oo had a March 1 value of only $164,480,
but were sold in 1916 for $276,15o. Accruals were disregarded in both cases, and
gains were computed for each transaction with the result that the first transaction
escaped tax and the second produced only $44,850 of taxable gains.
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of the assets for more than March 1 value did not result in taxable
gain unless and to the extent the proceeds of the sale exceeded the
original capital investment. In United States v. Flannery'8 3 and in
McCaughn v. Ludingtonl8 4 the Court again adopted the transactional
rather than the accrual approach and held that where the March i
value exceeded cost, the deductible loss, if any, could not amount to
more than the excess of the original investment over the proceeds of
the sale. Only actual gains and actual losses were recognized, and even
then only to the extent such gains and losses were attributable to tax-
able periods after February 28, 1913.185
The Court subsequently refused to reconsider its construction of
the basis provision of the 1916 Act or to give serious attention to the
language of a similar provision of the 1918 Act. In Flannery, decided
under the 1918 Act containing several clearly defined basis provisions,
B268 U.S. 98 (1925). Stock purchased prior to 1913 for less than $95,175 was
sold for that amount in 1919. The March 1 value was S1i6,325. The loss attribut-
able to taxable years was disallowed.
2268 U.S. 1o6 (1925). Stock purchased prior to 1913 for $32,5oo.oo with a March
1 value of $37,050.00 was sold in 1919 for $3,866.91. The deductible loss was only
$28,633.09.
'eIn Heiner v. Tindle, 276 U.S. 582 (1928), the case was returned to the lower
court to determine the value of a residence at the time it was converted (prior to
1913) to rental property. If the value at the time of conversion exceeded March 1
value, only the loss attributable to the period after February 28, 1913, was allowable.
If the value at the time of conversion should be less than March i value, only the
difference between the value at the time of conversion and the proceeds of the
sale was deductible. Adjustments to March i value, and to the value of the residence
on the date of conversion, were not discussed. At the new trial the language of
the Supreme Court was literally followed. Value at conversion date having been
determined to be $14oooo.oo, the difference between March i value ($12o,ooo.oo)
and selling price ($73,706.79), or $46,293.21, was deductible as a loss. 27 F. 1012
(W.D. Pa. 1928). The applicable statutes did not require, or necessarily suggest
(italics supplied by the Court notwithstanding), the results reached in Goodrich and
Flannery. In Goodrich, quoting with added emphasis from the 1916 Act (Sections
2(a) and 2 (c)), the Court noted that the tax was imposed on "gains," and "for the
purpose of ascertaining the gain derived from the sale or other disposition of
property [acquired before March 1, 1913], the fair market price or value of such
property as of [March 1, 1913] shall be the basis for determining the amount of such
gain derived." 255 U.S. at 535. Repeating its definition of income from Stratton's
Independence, note 46 supra, supplemented by Macomber, note 173 supra, as being
"the definition" approved by the Court, the word "gain" was again emphasized.
The Court, disregarding the legislative history of the 1916 Act (the Ways and
Means Committee bill had provided for the allocation of gain pro rata over the
time the capital asset was held; that provision was eliminated by the Senate
Finance Committee which adopted the basis approach), then concluded that it
was "thus very plain" that the statute taxed the proceeds of sales of property "to
the extent only that gains are derived thereupon by the vendor." 255 U.S. at 535.
The Court thus insisted on its own transactional computation of taxable gain even
though the basis provision in the Act provided for a different method of arriving
at the amount taxable.
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including March i value, the Court found it unnecessary to consider in
detail "contentions" regarding "the construction that should be given
to the provisions of the Act of 1918 in reference to deductible losses." 18 6
The "question should be resolved according to earlier decisions," be-
cause decisions "affecting the business interests of the country should
not be disturbed except for the most cogent reasons."'187 Only "actual"
gains or losses, therefore, initially determined without regard to taxable
years, were to be taken into account, a point of view which, if logically
followed, would make the accrual and annual reporting of many kinds
of business income impossible. 85
The transactional determination of gain or loss applied by the
Supreme Court in dealing with capital assets acquired before and sold
after March 1, 1913, was also applied by the Court for a time as a test
for the determination of other types of post-March i income. 8 9 In
Bowers v. Kerbaugh-Empire Co., o9 0 Kerbaugh-Empire had obtained
through the New York agent of a German bank numerous loans dur-
ing the years 1911-1913 for which it received dollars and gave its notes
payable in German marks. Those funds were "contemporaneously ad-
vanced" (on terms not specified in the opinion) to its wholly-owned
subsidiary company, H.S. Kerbaugh, Incorporated, engaged in large-
scale construction work, and were lost by the latter corporation during
the years 1913-1918.'91 In 1921 the Alien Property Custodian demanded
1"268 U.S. at 1o5.
11Id. Congress thereafter found difficulty in arriving at a satisfactory basis
provision for pre-March 1 acquisitions. That provision was frequently changed in
successive laws. For the current provision see INT. REV. CODE of 1954 § 053.
"'Considered as a form of inventory valuation, the Court, recognizing only
"real" gains and losses, required the use of cost or (March 1, 1913) market, which-
ever was lower, in computing the amount of a deductible loss, but required the
use of cost, or (March 1, 1913) market, whichever was higher, in computing the
amount of a taxable gain, the result being that gains and losses were measured
by different standards. In addition, an overall transactional computation sufficed in
some cases, a periodic computation in others, but under no circumstances would the
latter be permitted to exceed the former. Indeed, as was said by the Court in
Flannery, the March 1 basis provision in the statute was "merely a limitation upon
the amount of the actual gain or loss that would otherwise have been taxable or
deductible...." 268 U.S. at 103. See also Burnet v. Porter, 283 U.S. 230 (1931);
Burnet v. Henry, 283 U.S. 229 (1931); Burnet v. Houston, 283 U.S. 223 (1931).
"-In New York Life Ins. Co. v. Edwards, 271 U.S. 1o9 (1926), the amortization
of premium on bonds purchased was held not to be deductible under the 1913
Act, because it was not a "loss actually sustained within the year .... All of the
securities might have been sold thereafter above cost. The result of the venture
could not be known until they were either sold or paid off." Id. at ss6.
1' 271 U.S. 170 (1926).
""The subsidiary claimed and was allowed deductions for the losses during
1913-1918, but such losses exceeded income by more than the exchange profit of the
parent corporation. Id. at 175.
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and received the dollar equivalent of the marks which Kerbaugh-Em-
pire owed the German bank. Because of the greatly depreciated value
of the mark, Kerbaugh-Empire was able to liquidate its bank liability
for an amount substantially less than the dollars it had originally re-
ceived, and the Commissioner claimed that the difference represented
taxable income.
The Supreme Court, observing that taxes on income from some
sources were direct taxes, citing Pollock, that the sixteenth amendment
eliminated the apportionment required of taxes on "income," and that
substance over form should be emphasized, suggested that since the
financial transactions of Kerbaugh-Empire and the construction activi-
ties of H.S. Kerbaugh, extending over a decade, had resulted in a com-
bined loss, the Constitution prohibited an unapportioned tax on the
advantageous exchange transaction. Rejecting the analogy of a short
sale, the Court described the results of the various activities in terms of
consolidated corporate accounts:
When the loans were made and notes given, the assets and lia-
bilities of [Kerbaugh-Empire] were increased alike. The loss of
the money borrowed wiped out the increase in assets, but the
liability remained. The assets were further diminished by pay-
ment of the debt.19 2
The companies, however, were not consolidated for tax purposes. The
separate cash losses of H.S. Kerbaugh did not, as such, wipe out the in-
crease in the separate assets of Kerbaugh-Empire resulting from the
bank loan.193 Admittedly Kerbaugh-Empire originally received more
dollars from the bank than it paid to the Custodian in full satisfaction
of its debt. That settlement could hardly be considered a renegotiation
of the purchase price of marks or a gratuitous cancellation of indebt-
edness. Standing alone, the bank transaction resulted in gain to Ker-
baugh-Empire. Its net assets were substantially increased, not reduced,
by the payment to the Custodian of an amount less than the liability
discharged thereby. Whether any advances to and investments in H.S.
Kerbaugh, lost as a result of the latter's misfortunes, were deductible
by Kerbaugh-Empire was a related but distinct problem.
~"'d.
Presumably the advances to the subsidiary were reflected in the books of the
parent as dollar receivables in an amount equal to the cash obtained from the bank,
and the losses of the subsidiary, still solvent, would not destroy the value of that
asset; if insolvent after the losses, the value of the receivable would be impaired,
but not necessarily destroyed. Contrary to the Court's approach, the problem was
that of evaluation and of ascertaining the extent to which the deduction provisions
permitted Kerbaugh-Empire to charge off bad debts and the loss, if any, of invest-
ment in H.S. Kerbaugh stock.
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The decison in Kerbaugh-Empire embodied the worst features of
each of three unsatisfactory decisions: Cuba Railroad, in which the
sixteenth amendment was unnecessarily invoked to decide a case of
statutory interpretation; Southern Pacific, in which the Court failed to
distinguish between the earnings and profits of taxable entities; and
Goodrich, in which the implications of periodic income accrual were
rejected and gains were computed on a transactional basis. That there
should be constitutional objections to a corporate tax on gains from
foreign exchange transactions because of losses of another taxpayer
incurred over a number of years in the unsuccessful performance of
construction contracts was an astonishing suggestion-one that the
Supreme Court thereafter avoided by inconclusive distinctions.
When the Court decided Burnet v. Sanford & Brooks Co.19 4 it was
squarely faced with the irreconcilable conflict between annual account-
ing and its transactional theory of taxable income, found earlier in
Goodrich and Flannery, and later in Kerbaugh-Empire. In Sanford &
Brooks the taxpayer had abandoned dredging work conducted over a
period of several years (19l3-9 15) during which time its expenses sub-
stantially exceeded reimbursements because of the unexpected char-
acter of the materials dredged. The taxpayer brought suit and obtained
judgment for unreimbursed expenses in 192o and received pay-
ment in that year. The Commissioner included the recovery in tax-
payer's gross income for 192o, and the Supreme Court approved, taking
the position that dredging expenses were not capital assets which must
be recovered before gain can be recognized. Income must be reported
annually, 19 and reimbursement of expenses must be included in gross
income in the year of recovery. The Court concluded that the sixteenth
amendment did not prevent the taxation of income on an annual basis
even though the amount taxed was part of a transaction which resulted
in a net loss. Kerbaugh-Empire was distinguished:
In that case the taxpayer, which had lost, in business, borrowed
money, which was to be repaid in German marks, and which
was later repaid in depreciated currency, had neither made a
profit on the transaction, nor received any money or property
which could have been made subject to the tax.196
The reference to the profitless Kerbaugh-Empire transaction as a dis-
tinguishing feature could not have been seriously advanced, however,
because the Court in the opinion in which that theory of distinction
"'282 U.S. 359 (1931). See also Virginian Hotel Co. v. Helvering, 319 U.S. 523
(1943); INT. REV. CODE of 1954 § io16(a)(2)(B).
2See Heiner v. Mellon, 304 U.S. 516 (1938).
6282 U.S. at 364.
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was made rejected it by sustaining a tax on the profitless 9 7 dredging
transaction.
The second distinction made by the Court, that the taxpayer had not
"received any money or property which could have been made subject
to the tax," was, in effect, repudiated within the year by the Court's
decision in United States v. Kirby Lumber Co.'98 In that case the tax-
payer sold its bonds at par in 1923. Later in the same year it purchased
some of those bonds in the open market at a discount. The question
presented was whether the difference represented taxable gain. The
Court held that it did, citing Treasury regulations to that effect, and
correctly observed that as a result of the purchase of its bonds at a
discount the taxpayer had freed "assets previously offset by the obliga-
tion of bonds now extinct."'199 The Court, however, inadequately dis-
tinguished Kerbaugh-Empire,20 0 as it did again in Helvering v. Ameri-
can Chicle Co.2 01 In the latter case, the retirement at a discount of
bonds assumed 202 by the taxpayer in an acquisition of the assets of
another corporation was held to have given rise to taxable income. The
Court explained Kerbaugh-Empire by saying that in that case the "final
outcome of the dealing was revealed-the taxpayer suffered a loss.
Here, for aught we know, there was a substantial profit-certainly the
record does not show the contrary." 203
"7It was profitless in the sense that the entire dredging enterprise did not
result in gain.
"9284 U.S. 1 (1931).
0Id. at 3.
2"'Apparently misstating the facts, the Court said that in Kerbaugh-Empire the
taxpayer
owned the stock of another company that had borrowed money
repayable in marks or their equivalent for an enterprise that failed.
At the time of payment the marks had fallen in value, which so far
as it went was a gain [for the taxpayer]. But the transaction as a
whole was a loss, and the contention was denied. Here there was no
shrinkage of assets and the taxpayer made a clear gain.
2o4 U.S. at 3. After Sanford & Brooks, however, the "transaction as a whole," extend-
ing over a period of years, was not a valid test. Annual reporting dictated otherwise.
And the "shrinkage of assets," also present in the earlier case (in the form of
dredging losses) did not prevent the taxation of a profitless reimbursement of that
loss. The distinction in Kirby Lumber obviously failed to take into account Sanford
& Brooks, decided only ten months earlier.
2"291 U.S. 426 (1934).
"'The value of the consideration received by the assuming corporation, and
the market value of the obligation assumed, not given in the statement of facts,
suggest interesting questions when considered in light of Crane v. Commissioner, 331
U.S. 1 (1947).
"0'291 U.S. at 43o-31. In American Dental Co., 318 U.S. 322 (1943), cancellations
of rent and interest liabilities (accrued and deducted for tax purposes in prior
years) by creditors in straightforward business transactions (resulting in substantial
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Finally, in Commissioner v. Jacobson,204 an individual taxpayer
(rather than a corporation, as in Kirby Lumber) purchased his out-
standing bonds for less than face value, and the discount was held to be,
not a "gift," 205 but taxable income. Reverting again to its transactional
concept of income, the Court noted that in the case under considera-
tion the "proceeds of the obligations were not traced into identifiable
losses offsetting the debtor's realized gains from the discharge of these
obligations." 206 Thus the recurring dicta that loan transactions must
be tested by overall results, as in Goodrich, and not by annual deter-
minations, as in Sanford & Brooks, kept alive the flickering light of
Kerbaugh-Empire.
The Court's early views regarding closely controlled corporations,
like its transactional test for gain, also proved to be troublesome. Dis-
regard of the corporate entity, suggested by Turrish, Southern Pacific,
and Gulf Oil, and implicit in Kerbaugh-Empire, had found another
form in Weiss v. Steam 20 7 where the Supreme Court held that rein-
corporation in the state of original incorporation and a "mere change"
in the "technical ownership of an enterprise" did not give rise to taxable
gain to a shareholder exchanging shares of stock in the old corporation
for shares in the new. The Court's theory was that "Something more is
necessary-something which gives the stockholder a thing really differ-
ent from what he theretofore had," citing Towne in addition to South-
ern Pacific and Gulf Oil.20s
credits to the taxpayer's surplus) were held to be excludable from gross income as
"gifts." The Supreme Court noted that: "Possibly because it seems beyond the
legislative purpose to enact income taxes for savings on debts, courts have been
astute to avoid taxing every balance sheet improvement brought about through a
debt reduction." Id. at 327. See also Bogardus v. Commissioner, 302 U.S. 34 (1937).
In Dobson v. Commissioner, 320 U.S. 489 (2943), the Court affirmed a Tax Court
decision which held that the current recovery of part of a loss from the sale of
stock in an earlier year (the entire transaction, including the recovery, resulted in
a loss) was not taxable, because "no principle of law compels the Tax Court to
find taxable income in a transaction where as a matter of fact it found no economic
gain and no use of the transaction to gain tax benefit." Id. at 5o6.
1 336 U.S. 28 (1949).
20Section 215 of the 1939 Act, adding § 22(b)( 9) to the 1939 Internal Revenue
Code to provide special treatment for the discharge of such indebtedness of corpora-
tions in certain cases, was said to "indicate that such gains were recognized as not
having been excluded from gross income by § 22(b)(3) or by any other Section."
336 U.S. at 44. See INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §§ 108, 1017.
'"336 U.S. at 30.
T265 U.S. 242 (1924).
2Id. at 254- "Something more" had been found earlier in United States v.
Phellis, 257 U.S. 156 (a921); Rockefeller v. United States, 257 U.S. 176 (1921) and
Cullinan v. Walker, 262 U.S. 134 (1923), and was later found in Marr v. United
States, 268 U.S. 536 (1925). See also New Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvering, 292 U.S.
435 (934) (dealing with a loss deduction claimed by a successor company).
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The theory of the Steam case understandably caused the issue to
be raised in Burnet v. Commonwealth Improvement Co. 209 as to
whether or not a sale by a corporation to its sole shareholder (an
estate) required "something more" to justify an income tax on the
corporation as a result of the transaction. From an economic point of
view, the combined enterprise (corporation and sole shareholder) was
"no richer than before" as a result of the sale between the owner and its
incorporated pocketbook or, if additional advantage had been gained,
it was, as in Towne, de minimis21 0-not a gain in the amount of $1,o55,-
953.12, as computed by the Commissioner. That argument, however,
was not effective because the two entities for years had filed separate tax
returns and a loss in the amount of $28,125 had been claimed by the
corporation on the identical transaction before the Court, a recom-
putation of basis by the Commissioner on audit producing the gain in
question. Although the parent and subsidiary companies in Southern
Pacific also had filed separate tax returns, the Court asserted that the
case before it did not present "peculiar facts" such as those present in
the earlier case. The gain was taxable.2 11
In Gregory v. Helvering,2 12 as in Steam, substance rather than form
prevailed and the corporate entity was again disregarded. The Court
held that the nonrecognition provisions of the 1928 Act,2 13 dealing
with spin-offs, were not applicable to a short-lived corporation formed
solely for the purpose of meeting the terms of the statute even though
the statute was followed to the "letter." The transaction was simply "an
operation having no business or corporate purpose," the corporation
was a "contrivance."
2 14
Griffiths v. Commissioner2 15 and Higgins v. Smith2 16 added to the
m287 U.S. 415 (1932).
"°See note 121 supra.
2'287 U.S. at 417, 419-20.
2'293 U.S. 465 (1935).
r'Act of May 29, 1928, ch. 852, § 112, 45 Stat. 816.
"'293 U.S. at 469. See also Minnesota Tea Co. v. Helvering, 3o2 U.S. 609 (1938).
Form rather than substance prevailed in Groman v. Commissioner, 302 U.S. 82
(1937), and Helvering v. Blashford, 302 U.S. 454 (1938), perhaps unnecessarily,
where the Court insisted on strict regard for the separate entities of parent and
subsidiary corporations in again declaring inapplicable the nonrecognition pro-
visions of Section 112. Subsequent (piecemeal) attempts by Congress to reverse
Groman and Blashford deprived -those decisions of much of 'their force. See INT.
REV. CODE of 1954, § 368 and Public Law 91-693, January 12, 1971.
2'3 0 8 U.S. 355 (1939). A fraud claim arising out of a loss on the sale of stock
by Griffiths to Lay, deducted by Griffiths in a prior year and taxable if recovered,
was transferred to a corporation (wholly-owned by Griffiths) organized in anticipa-
tion of the immediate settlement of the claim. The recovery was held to be taxable
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confusion. In those cases the Court held that amounts recovered in
respect of a fraud claim previously transferred to a wholly-owned
corporation were taxable to the transferor-shareholder (Griffiths), and
that a loss on the sale of assets by a shareholder (Smith) to his wholly-
owned corporation was not deductible. Yet a simliar attempt on the part
of a shareholder to disregard his corporation as a tax entity was
promptly rejected in Moline Properties, Inc. v. Commissioner,217 the
Court again attempting to resolve the uncertainty created by Southern
Pacific.2 1 8 But it was not until Interstate Transit Lines v. Commission-
er.,219 decided "because of uncertainities in this area of important federal
tax law,' 220 that the Court finally came to grips with the intercom-
pany problems suggested by Southern Pacific and Gulf Oil. In Inter-
to Griffiths in spite of the "technically elegant arrangement." Taxation was con-
cerned with the command over the property taxed,
[a]nd it makes no difference that such 'command' may be exercised
through specific retention of legal title or the creation of a new
equitable but controlled interest, or the maintenance of effective
benefit through the interposition of a subservient agency .... What
Lay gave, Griffiths in reality got, and on that he must be taxed.
Id. at 357-58.
""°3o8 U.S. 473 (194o). The sole shareholder claimed as a deduction the loss
from a sale of securities to Innisfail. Although recognizing that his corporation,
Innisfail, was an entity for tax purposes and was assumed to have acquired title to
the securities, "the taxpayer retained the control," he could "manipulate as he
chose.. .and command the disposition of the securities themselves. There is not
enough of substance in such a sale finally to determine a loss." Id. at 476. As to
the tax sustained in Commonwealth Improvement, a "taxpayer is free to adopt such
organization for his affairs as he may choose and having elected to do some business
as a corporation, he must accept the tax disadvantages." The Government "may not
be required to acquiesce in the taxpayer's election..." but may "look at actualities"
and, if the form employed is "unreal or a sham may sustain or disregard the effect
of the fiction as best serves the purpose of the tax statute." Id. at 477.
2'7319 U.S. 436 0943). The sole shareholder sought to include in his individual
return the profit from the sale of real estate held in the name of his wholly-owned,
virtually inactive, corporation. The attempt failed. Where the corporate purpose
"is the equivalent of business activity or is followed by the carrying on of business
by the corporation, the corporation remains a separate taxable entity .... [but] the
corporate form may be disregarded where it is sham or unreal." Id. at 439. While
under the sole control of the shareholder the corporation mortgaged its property,
discharged the mortgage, sold portions of its property, leased property and filed
income tax returns. The corporation "had a tax identity distinct from its share-
holder..." and was not his agent merely because of "the mere fact of existence."
Id. at 44o.
18outhern Pacific and Gulf Oil were referred to as "recognized exceptions" to
the separate treatment which must be given corporations serving a business purpose,
and "lay down no rule for tax purposes .... In general, in matters relating to the
revenue, the corporate form may be disregarded where it is a sham or unreal. In
such situations the form is a bald and mischievous fiction." 319 U.S. at 438-39.
'"319 U.S. 590 (1943).
"'Id. at 591 (referring specifically to Moline Properties, note 217 supra).
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state, the parent corporation, not permitted to engage in interstate
transportation in California, organized for that purpose a subsidiary
company to engage in both interstate and intrastate transportation.
An intercompany agreement required the parent to reimburse the
subsidiary for all operating deficits, and liability thereby incurred under
the contract was claimed as a deduction by the parent. The deduction
was disallowed. "Whether phrased as the payment of an expense in a
business conducted for a principal by an agent or as a case where equity
and reality require that the separate corporate entities be ignored or as
the incurring under contract of a necessary expense" 221 it was held that
to be deductible the reimbursement of the subsidiary's operating defic-
it must be an expense of the parent's business. The parent could not
legally operate locally in California. The Court said that business con-
ducted there was not the parent's business (or if the interstate portion
should be so considered, the expense had not been allocated), and "[t]he
mere fact that the expense was incurred under contractual obligation
does not of course make it the equivalent of a rightful deduction .... " 222
Six years later certiorari was granted in National Carbide Corpora-
tion v. Commissioner223 "because of... conflict of opinion and the dis-
agreement between courts as to the continuing vitality of Southern
Pacific."224 Air Reduction Corporation (Airco) operated major areas
of its business through wholly-owned subsidiary companies "employed
as agents to manage and operate plants designed for the produciton of
the products assigned to each, and as agents to sell the output of the
plants." Airco furnished capital and executive management. The sub-
sidiaries were required to pay Airco all profits earned in excess of
nominal amounts.225 Declaring that the control exercised by Airco
over its subsidiaries did not differ in principle from that exercised in
Moline Properties,226 the Court held that the "agency" contracts re-
quiring the payment of substantially all of the profits to Airco were not
effective. "Our decisions requiring that income be taxed to those who
earn it, despite anticipatory agreements designed to prevent vesting of
the income in the earners . . ." foreclosed the result sought by Airco.2 27
22"319 U.S. at 591.
2Id. at 594.
2336 US. 4-22 (1949)-
-id. at 426. The Tax Court, 8 T.C. 594 (1947) (three judges dissenting), had
been reversed by the second circuit. 167 F.2d 3o4 (2d Cir. 1948).
-- 336 U.S. at 425. Agent compensation was fixed at 6% of outstanding capital
stock ranging from 5o to 125 shares of $ioo par value each, or compensation in an
aggregate amount of $1.35o per annum.
""Id. at 433-34-
-21Id. at 436.
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To be a true agent, its "business purpose must be the carrying on of the
normal duties of an agent."
228
The Airco subsidiaries were obviously engaged in business as separ-
ate entities (in the sense that that term is generally applied to corpora-
tions) and were not dormant companies without assets or useful busi-
ness purpose. Airco's control alone did not, in orthodox legal termino-
logy, make them agents. 229 The contracts with Airco used agency terms,
but the power of the subsidiaries to alter legal relations between Airco
and third persons was not established; non-agent independent con-
tractors might more aptly characterize the subsidiary companies. The
Court's decision did approve, in effect, a shift by the Commissioner of
income from Airco to its subsidiary companies, and that appears to be
the substance of the decision. To pay three companies an aggregate of
,1,350' per year to manage assets of some $2o,ooo,ooo with annual sales
of more than that amount, producing over $4,000,000 in income, indi-
cates something less than arm's length dealing between taxable entities.
The parties, not having provided for reasonable compensation, were
not permitted to object to the Commissioner's reallocation, particularly
since the Court viewed assets advanced by Airco to its subsidiaries as
"capital contributions rather than loans."2 30 Although the Court failed
to establish a clear guide for future decisions (other than to indicate
that a corporation ordinarily will be taxed as such, unless the Commis-
sioner finds it a "sham or unreal"), 231 the Court again clearly made the
point that Southern Pacific "lays down [no] rule for tax purposes. '23 2
National Carbide also illustrated another point. Disregard of the
corporate entity in Turrish and Southern Pacific, without an articula-
tion of valid reasons therefor, furnished little direction for either
Treasury or the taxpayer. Those early cases involved distributions of
pre-March 1 earnings. Congress seemed to regard such distributions as
being exempt from tax,233 and much confusion could have been avoid-
ed, if the cases had been decided accordingly. Hornby, decided the same
2id. at 437. The Court noted that even a corporate agent may be disregarded
by the Commissioner "if it is a sham or unreal." Id. at 437 n.2o.'See RFSTATEMFNT (SEcOND) oF AGENCY § 14(m) (1958).
-"336 U.S. at 435.
a'Note 228 supra. See also Moline Properties, note 217 supra.
223 3 6 U.S. at 432. See also note 218 supra.
Our reluctance to erase Southern Pacific from the books has been
due not to the belief that it lays down a correct rule for tax pur-
poses generally, but to the fact that it concerns 'very peculiar facts'
which make it distinguishable from later cases ....
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day as Turrish and Southern Pacific, unaccountably went the other
way. In order to distinguish the cases, the Court was forced to rely on
inapplicable interpretations of Civil War income tax legislation in
Turrish and to ignore a taxpaying subsidiary company in Southern
Pacific, in an attempt to avoid a conflict with its reasoning in Hornby.
The Court's failure to admit its error in Hornby and to redefine Turrish
and Southern Pacific accordingly, has led to needless litigation. It was
not until National Carbide that some semblance of direction was sug-
gested: Whether holding agency powers or not, closely held corpora-
tions must be dealt with on an arm's length basis by their respective
owners for purposes serving genuine business needs, and transactions
between the parties must be evidenced by contemporaneous (account-
ing) records clearly reflecting the facts. Contentions inconsistent with
those records, and ambiguous relationships between the corporation
and its owner will invite Treasury action designed to produce maxi-
mum public revenue.
VI. "True" Income and Accounting: Some Problems of
Valuation and of Timing.
In Stratton's Independence the Supreme Court disavowed any at-
tempt to formulate a proper definition of income. Congress did not
intend by the 19o9 Act to enact an income tax law.234 Undefined "gross
income" was a "sufficiently accurate index"235 of the privilege taxed.
Later in Cuba Railroad it was said that the meaning of income as used
in the 19o9 Act was "not to be distinguished from" the meaning of in-
come as used in later revenue legislation,236 and statements of like im-
port were made in other cases. 237 As the Supreme Court in substance
has correctly indicated, the post-sixteenth amendment income tax laws
did not impose a tax on business income as that term was generally un-
i2 2 3 1 U.S. at 414.
mId. at 417.
23Edwards v. Cuba R.R., 268 U.S. 628, 631 (1925).
inSee e.g., Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U.S. 1o3 (1932):
And before the 1921 Act this Court had indicated (see Eisner v.
Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 2o7), what it later held, that 'income,' as
used in the revenue acts taxing income, adopted since the Six-
teenth Amendment, has the same meaning that it had in the Act of
19o9. Id. at io9 .
In Southern Pacific Co. v. Lowe, 247 U.S. 33o (1918) the Court stated:
Certainly the term "income" has no broader meaning in the 1913
Act than that of 19o9 (see Stratton's Independence v. Howbert,
231 U.S. 399, 416, 417), and for the present purpose we assume there
is no difference in its meaning as used in the two acts.
Id. at 335.
SUPREME COURT TAX ACCOUNTING
derstood. Taxable income is a vague statutory concept promulgated by
Congress without clear reference to any well-developed system of in-
come determination and the Supreme Court from the outset has inter-
preted income tax legislation in a manner which has further blurred
that already inadequate concept. In matters of constitutional (six-
teenth amendment) interpretation, the Court has been without a satis-
factory point of reference. Disapproval of congressional action was
largely measured by the Court's own definition of i9g9 Act income.
238
That definition was formulated originally in Stratton's Independence
where "theoretical distinctions between capital and income" 239 were
not deemed relevant. The definition, which served little useful purpose
in the case in which it was announced, has failed to provide a helpful
guide under the amendment where the distinction was held to be im-
portant.
As early as 1916 Congress had supplemented Treasury attempts to
provide workable rules for computing business income by incorporating
relief provisions in the 1916 Act. Without making changes in basic
legislation, Congress authorized alternate systems of income determina-
tion in Section 13 (d) of the Act which provided that a corporation
"keeping accounts upon any basis other than that of actual receipts and
disbursements, unless such other basis does not clearly reflect its in-
come,"2 40 may, subject to Treasury regulations, "make its return upon
the basis upon which its accounts are kept." As authorized by Sec-
tion 13 (d), Treasury formally ruled that the deduction of accrued ex-
penses would be permitted corporations which accrue such charges
"on their books," provided (i) "such accounts approximate as nearly
as possible actual liabilities," and (2) that the "income accruing to the
corporation" is returned "on the same basis." 24 1 Since Section 12(a) of
mSee note 173 supra.
2231 U.S. at 414.
- 10Act of Sept. 8, 1916, ch. 463, § 13, 39 Stat. 771. Section 8(g) contained a similar
provision for individuals. 39 Stat. 756, 763 (1916). See note 325 infra for a frequ-
ently ignored statement of present congressional policy.
21mT.D. 2433, 19 TREAs. DEC. INT. REnv. 5 (1917). The Commissioner was not
required to make an election between the taxpayer's books and a cash basis tax
return, but could require adjustments to book income in order to determine taxable
income. United States v. American Can Co., 280 U.S. 412 (193o); Niles Bement Pond
Co. v. United States, 281 U.S. 357 (193o). The Supreme Court appeared to consider
distortions resulting from annual accounting a virtue in Lucas v. Structural Steel
Co., 281 U.S. 264 (193o). The Court declared that a taxpayer engaged in the fabrica-
tion and erection of structural steel was required to use inventories of its steel on
hand in order "to assign to each period its profits and losses." Id. at 268. The Court
disapproved the taxpayer's use of the base stock method of inventory valuation be-
cause it tended to equalize income over a period of years and was thus deemed to be
inconsistent with annual accounting required by Congress for income tax purposes.
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the 1916 Act expressly permitted corporations to deduct certain ex-
penses in the year "paid," it was necessary to reconcile those specific
cash basis provisions with the general language of Section i 3 (d). That
problem of reconciliation reached the Court in United States v. Ander-
son.2 42 The court below (the Court of Claims) in two cases 243 had per-
mitted the deduction in 1917, the year the 1916 munitions tax was
assessed and paid. One taxpayer, Burton-Richards Co., had accrued on
its books in 1916 a reserve of $140,000 for munitions tax liability. The
reserve was eliminated, however, as of December 31, 1916, and a similar
reserve was set up by a charge to surplus but in the lesser amount of
$86,541.95. The munitions tax return for 1916 was filed and tax in the
amount of 586,541.95 was paid in 1917. Later in 1917 the return was ex-
amined and 5o% of the amortization deduction claimed therein was dis-
allowed, resulting in $25,877.5o additional munitions tax liability,
which was also paid in 1917.244 The second taxpayer, Yale & Towne
Manufacturing Co., as of December 31, 1916, set up a reserve for taxes
which included an estimated munitions tax in the amount of $247,-
763.19. That amount was reported and paid in 1917, but on review an
additional 1916 munitions tax of $7,933.60 was demanded and paid in
1917.245
In reversing the conclusion of the Court of Claims that the 1916
munitions taxes were deductible in 1917, the Supreme Court held that
Section 12(a) of the 1916 Act providing for the deduction of taxes paid
did not apply when taxpayers did not or could not report on a cash
basis. The Court said that Section 13 (d), which went beyond Treasury
rulings and regulations granting relief from the strict cash basis pro-
visions of earlier legislation, was intended to permit taxpayers to keep
their books and make their returns "according to scientific accounting
principles, by charging against income earned during the taxable per-
iod, the expense incurred in and properly attributable to the process
of earning income during that period. '2 46 Since the taxpayer's "true
(Cf. INT. REv. CODE Of 1954, § 472 (lifo).) "Whether in a particular business inven-
tories are necessary for the determination of income is a practical question left by
statute to the judgment of the Commissioner." 281 U.S. at 268. See INT. REV. CODE
of 1954, § 471. Accrual basis cattle producers were required to use inventories in
United States v. Catto, 384 U.S. 102 (1966). But sde United States Cartridge Co. v.
United States, note 293 infra (disapproving inventory adjustments by the Com-
missioner).
'269 U.S. 422 (1926).21Yale & Towne Mfg. Co. v. United States, 6o Ct. Cl. 440 (1925); Anderson v.
United States, 6o Ct. Cl. io6 (1925).
26o Ct. Cl. at 107-09.
"16o Ct. Cl. at 446-47.
m269 U.S. at 440.
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income for the year 1916 could not have been determined without de-
ducting from its gross income for the year the total cost and expenses
attributable to the production of that income during the year."
247
Consequently, the Court held that the taxpayer must follow a con-
sistent practice; it may not deduct some accrued expenses and not
others. As to the argument that the munitions tax had not "accrued"
in 1916, Mr. Justice Stone observed that in advance of assessment "all
the events may occur which fix the amount of the tax and determine
the liability of the taxpayer to pay it." 248 For the "purposes of account-
ing and of ascertaining true income," the munitions tax "did not stand
on any different footing than other accrued expenses." 249 In any event,
Mr. Justice Stone concluded, Section i3(d) did not use the word "ac-
crue" or "accrued," but "merely provides for a return upon the basis
upon which the taxpayer's accounts are kept, if it reflects income."
2 50
It should be noted that Mr. Justice Stone did not say that the
munitions tax must be deducted only in the year in which "all events"
occurred which fixed the amount of the tax and determined the liabil-
ity to pay it. The emphasis was upon the ascertainment of "true in-
come" by deducting all expenses attributable to the production of that
income. Books of account which properly reflected income must be
followed for tax purposes and the related expenses allowed, "accrued"
or not.
In Anderson, strictly speaking, "all the events" which fixed the
amount of the munitions tax had not actually occurred in 1916. The
taxpayers were unquestionably liable, but the amount of liability was
measured by munitions profits. Those profits were determined in part
by estimates and allocations251 necessarily made after the year had actu-
2'11d. In both Burton-Richards and Yale & Towne the Commissioner had dis-
allowed as 1917 deductions not only the munitions tax reported in the 1916 returns
as filed but also the additional 1916 munitions tax assessed and paid in 1917. The
Supreme Court did not refer to the additional assessment; instead, the Court con-
cluded that "the reserves for taxes which appeared on [Yale 9- Towne's] books in
1916 were deductible under § i3(d) of the Act of 1916 and Treasury Decision 2433
in its income tax return on the accrual basis for that year." 269 U.S. at 442. Finding
that Burton-Richards kept its books on the accrual basis, the Court rejected its
1917 claims for refund because it had not met the burden of proving "the facts
establishing the invalidity of the tax." Id. at 443.
w269 U.S. at 441; see Treas. Regs. § i.46i(a)(2) (1964) incorporating the "all
events" test.
m269 U.S. at 441.
=1_d.
raThe 1916 munitions tax was 1212% of net profits computed by deducting
from the gross amount received or accrued for the year from the sale of munitions
the following items to the extent they were related to munitions: (i) cost of raw
19711
52 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXVIII
ally ended, but prior to the closing of the accounts. Furthermore, in
both cases decided by Anderson, the munitions profits were reestimated
and were substantially increased after the returns had been filed in
1917. The determination and redetermination of munitions income in
1917 were events necessary to the exact computation of the 1916 muni-
tion tax liability, but those events were considered irrelevant, and pro-
perly so, in solving the real question at hand, the ascertainment of the
year to which the munitions tax should be attributed. The munitions
tax was generated by 1916 income, and was clearly attributable to that
year. The tax was deductible in 1916, not 1917.252
A somewhat more troublesome problem was presented in American
National Co. v. United States.253 The taxpayer was engaged in the busi-
ness of lending money for which it received five-year, 5% mortgage
notes. Taxpayer also received from the borrower at the time the ori-
ginal loan was made a second note which was payable in two years and
was equal to io% of the mortgage note. The taxpayer would then sell
the first note with a side agreement by the taxpayer to pay the purchaser
an additional 1% for each of the five years the loan remained outstand-
ing.254 In its accounting records the taxpayer (i) included the prin-
cipal amount of the two-year note in income in the year it was received
from the borrower and (2) included as an expense in the year the five-
year note was sold its maximum contractual liability as a result of the
side agreement, 5% in the aggregate. Whenever the borrower paid his
five-year note before maturity, the taxpayer's estimated liability under
the side agreement was accordingly reduced, and the excess expense
deduction in the earlier year was adjusted in the later year by a credit
to income. The Commissioner disallowed the maximum estimated lia-
bility as a deduction in the year the agreement was entered into but
allowed that part of the obligation which became due in the taxable
year. The Supreme Court disagreed. The Court held that the liabilities
materials, (2) running expenses, (3) interest, (4) taxes, (5) losses, and (6) a reasonable
allowance for amortization, "account being taken of the exceptional depreciation
of special plants." 39 Stat. 780, §§ 3oo-o2 (1916).
2 '- See also Aluminum Castings Co. v. Routzahn, 282 U.S. 92 (1930). For another
aspect of Anderson, see Fawcus Machine Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 375 (1931),
where for excess profits tax purposes the 1918 income tax was deemed to have
been paid out of 1918 income even though the 1918 Act was not enacted until
February 24, 1919. and the amount of 1918 taxes could not have been finally com-
puted on December 31, 1918. But see Niles Bement Pond Co. v. United States, 281
U.S. 357 (1930) (where the British income tax, based on different fiscal periods, was
before the Court).
m'274 U.S. 99 (1927).
'"The taxpayer "from and after 1916" sold many of these notes directly to
investors, 14, at 102,
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of the taxpayer to the investors were not "analogous to obligations to
pay interest on money borrowed, but were expenses incurred in selling
the loan notes."2- The method of accounting adopted by the taxpayer
"clearly reflected the true income." The commission notes, io% of the
original loan, had been included in gross income at full face value in
the year of acquisition, and it was deemed proper to permit the deduc-
tion of the full 5% potential liability under the side agreements in the
year the side agreements were made.
In Anderson, "true" income could not be determined without de-
ducting from the year's gross income "the total cost and expenses at-
tributable to the production of that income during the year."250 In
American National, the Court's attention was also directed to the deter-
mination of "true" income, but the interrelated problems of valuation
and of timing were not carefully examined. Aside from the question
of bad debts, the two-year notes should have been reported, strictly
speaking, at current market value, not in the principal amount payable
two years later. And the maximum amounts payable under the side
agreements should have been adjusted downward, in the light of ex-
perience, by anticipating and estimating prepayments of principal by
the makers of the notes. In addition, such adjusted future payments
under the side agreements also should have been discounted to present
value.257 Amounts payable five years in the future obviously did not
have the same immediate "cost" as like amounts payable currently.258
Consequently, while accepting the Court's view that the obligations
were not "analogous to obligations to pay interest," the interest factor
nevertheless was present. Perhaps the Court assumed that compensating
accounting errors permitted the reflection of "true" income. But such
an assumption, if made, would be suspect, in view of the early insol-
vency of the taxpayer.250 But whatever may have been the Court's as-
sumption, the Court, for a period of time at least, took the view that
"true" income was book income, if revenues and expenses were accrued
on a consistent basis. 260
l-Id. at 1o5.
m269 U.S. at 44o.
2Although not a practice generally followed, as such, in estimating future
expenses, the impact is frequently reflected in the amounts estimated.
5See W. PATON, Special Applications of Discounting, in PATON ON ACCOUNTING
219 (H. Taggart ed. 1969).
,The receiver for the taxpayer filed the claim for refund of tax paid as a
result of the Commissioner's disallowance of the potential selling expense. 269
U.S. at 435.
0"[I]t is the purpose of the [1918] Act to require returns that clearly reflect
taxable income. That purpose will not be accomplished unless income received and
deductible disbursements are treated consistently." United States v. Mitchell, 271
U.S. 9, 12 (1926).
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Unlike recurring costs associated with related income, such as the
tax involved in Anderson and the selling expense involved in American
National, losses represent quite a different problem. Losses being
counter-productive and difficult, sometimes impossible, to predict, the
19o9 Act and subsequent Acts understandably did not attempt to match
losses with income; losses were deductible in the year "sustained." 261 In
United States v. S.S. White Dental Manufacturing Co.,262 the taxpayer's
entire investment (shares of stock and receivables) in a German sub-
sidiary company was held to be deductible in 1918, the year the German
government seized the property of the subsidiary. The "taking" was
said to be legal and there was no real opportunity for immediate judi-
cial redress. Even though a small amount was recovered in 1922 from
the remaining assets of the subsidiary, and a claim with the Mixed
Claims Commission had been allowed (but not paid) in 1924, the 1918
seizure was, nevertheless, a closed transaction; any recovery in respect
of the asset "might be secured not as a matter of right, but as a matter
either of grace to the vanquished or exaction by the victor." The Court
took the further view that
a loss may become complete enough for deduction without the
taxpayer's establishing that there is no possibility of an eventual
recoupment. It would require a high degree of optomism to
discern in the seizure of enemy property by the German govern-
ment in 1918 more than a remote hope of ultimate salvage from
the wreck of the war. The Taxing Act does not require the tax-
payer to be an incorrigible optimist.263
26Note 2o supra.
2274 U.S. 398 (1927).
63274 U.S. at 402-03. On the other side of the conflict, Armistice, November ii,
1918, marked the appropriate event making obsolescent buildings used to produce
munitions which would not be needed after that date, and gave rise to a deduction
in 1918. United States Cartridge Co. v. United States, 284 U.S. 511 (1932). Prohibition
presented similar problems of timing of losses after the initial question of deducti-
bility had been resolved. In Clark v. Haberle Crystal Spring Brewing Co., 280 U.S.
384 (1930), and Renziehausen v. Lucas, 280 U.S. 387 (1930), the Court declared that
the allowance for obsolescence did not include the loss of goodwill (including trade-
marks, trade brands, and trade names) of a brewery destroyed by prohibition even
though the amount of the loss was not in dispute. But in V. Loewers Gamorinus
Brewery Co. v. Anderson, 282 U.S. 638 (1931), and Burnet v. National Industrial
Alcohol Co., 282 U.S. 646 (1931), the taxpayers were permitted to deduct obsolescence
losses of tangible property. It was shown "that the imminence of prohibition be-
came known in January of 1918 and that it took effect in January of 192o." 282
U.S. at 645. The amount deductible for the years 1918-1919 was not before the
Court. In Burnet v. Niagra Falls Brewing Co., 282 U.S. 648 (1931), however, the
Court said that:
Neither the cost of obsolescence nor of accruing exhaustion, wear
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In White Dental, the fact of loss had been determined by seizure of
assets by the German government and had been currently recognized in
the taxpayer's books. But where loss had not been ascertained in the
earlier years, attempts to reopen those years met with predictable judi-
cial resistance. As the Court held in Sanford & Brooks,264 new items re-
lating to past years must be included in current income, a generally ac-
cepted accounting practice based on convenience, and on a reluctance to
change earlier reports, frequently published and often widely distri-
buted. The decisions of the Court in dealing with items of prior years
were understandably based on somewhat different grounds.265 In San-
ford & Brooks, the fiscal needs of the government were stressed, and
earlier in Lewellyn v. Electric Reduction Co. 2 66 a second and entirely
different, subjective, approach had been adopted. The taxpayer had
made a prepayment for goods in 1918 to a seller who proved to be ir-
responsible. Litigation was not instituted until the following year, and
was not terminated until several years thereafter. The Court said that
There is nothing in the findings from which we could conclude
that [the taxpayer] in 1918 had ceased to regard his rights under
the contract as having value or that there was then reasonable
ground to suppose that efforts to enforce them would be fruit-
less. 26 7
and tear that is properly chargeable in any period of time can be
measured accurately. A reasonable approximation of the amount
that fairly may be included in the accounts of any year is all that
is required.
Id. at 655. The period of obsolescence "commenced about the first of igiS and
would end upon the taking effect of prohibition." Id. Compare New York Life In-
surance Co. v. Edwards, note 189 supra. See INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 165 (i)(1)
(Cuban confiscations).
2lLNote 194 supra.
sSee United States v. Lewis, 340 U.S. 590 (1951), where excess bonus returned
to employer was held to have been received under a "claim of right," and year of
receipt may not be reopened. But see Freuler v. Helvering, 291 U.S. 85 (1934), where
excess payments by trustee to beneficiaries were not includable in income. Prior
years, however, may be examined to determine tax aspects of a current deduction.
See Arrowsmith v. Commissioner, 344 U.S. 6 (1952), where a prior year was
examined to determine whether repayment gave rise to a regular or a capital loss;
United States v. Skelly Oil Co.. 394 U.S. 678 (1969), where the deduction for refunds
of overcharges for natural gas sold in earlier years was reduced by percentage de-
pletion allowed in earlier years as a result of those overcharges. Compare Douglas
v. Commissioner, 322 U.S. 275 (1944). See also INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §§ 125o and
1245 (sales of certain depreciable property). For important legislative changes in
the consequences of annual accounting, see §§ 172 (carryback and carryover of net
operating losses), 1212 (capital loss carryovers), and 1301-1305 (income averaging).
2'275 U.S. 243 (1927).
xId. at 247.
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The Court then concluded that the loss may not be deducted "before
the future fails to justify [the taxpayer's] hopes." 2 68
Reluctance to reopen earlier years was also reflected in the Court's
treatment of voluntary payments made in recognition of past services.
-In Lucas v. Ox Fibre Brush Co. 2 69 such payments, reasonable in
amount, were held to be deductible in the year paid, not in the years
during which the services had been performed. The Court rejected the
Commissioner's contentions that the deduction in the year paid dis-
torted income for that year, and that "the basic principle to be applied
is that true net income is to be taxed."270 Instead, the Court took the
position that the statutory authority of the Commissioner to regulate
methods of accounting did not justify the allocation to previous years of
a proper payment made in the current year
when the obligation to pay was incurred during that year and not
previously. In the present instance, the expense could not be at-
tributed to earlier years, for it was neither paid nor incurred in
those years. There was no earlier accrual of liability. It was de-
ductible in the year 1920 or not at all. Being deductible as a
reasonable payment, there was no authority vested in the Com-
missioner to disregard the actual transaction and to readjust
the income on another basis which did not respond to the
facts."271
Anderson was distinguished on the ground that "liability for the muni-
tions tax at a fixed rate had accrued in the earlier year (ig6) and was
a charge on the business of that year, although the precise amount
was ascertained and was payable in 1917," and American National was
distinguished on the ground that in that case "there was a contract pro-
viding definitely for the payment." 272 Absence of liability, rather than
the necessity for annual reporting, thus became a third justification for
the Court's refusal to reopen returns for earlier years.
Items not carefully and reasonably estimated and not recorded in
the books of the corporate taxpayer for the year in which the deduction
was claimed obviously invited disallowance. In White Dental the loss
had been recorded in the books of the taxpayer in the year claimed for
tax purposes273 and was allowed. In Electric Reduction the loss had not
=Id.




'31n White Dental the entire amount of the investment as shown by its books
was charged off by the taxpayer in 1918 (although book income for that year
apparently did not bear the entire amount of the loss) and was claimed for tax
purposes in the 1918 return as filed. 274 U.S. at 400.
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been so recorded and was disallowed. Lucas v. American Code Co.274
presented an intermediate situation. In that case liability was estab-
lished by final judgment in 1923 for the breach in 1919 of an employ-
ment contract which, at the time of breach, had some eighteen years
to run. Commissions that the former employee would have received in
the year of discharge had been accrued on the books of the taxpayer in
recognition of its possible liability. The Court held that neither the
amount accrued in 1919 nor the amount of the judgment was allow-
able as a deduction for igig. "Generally speaking, the income tax law
is concerned only with realized losses, as with realized gains."27 While
the facts "determining liability" had occurred in i919, the amount to
be recovered, if any, "depended in large part on future events." 270
The case at bar is unlike Anderson. There, the liability for the
munitions tax at a fixed rate on the business done in 1916 had
confessedly accrued in that year and was a charge on the busi-
ness of that year, although the exact amount due may not have
been then ascertainable and the tax was not payable until
1917.277
A reserve in an amount equal to the compensation which the discharged
employee would have received in 1919, set up on the taxpayer's books
in that year, "had no relation to the apprehended loss,"278 and it was
not so regarded by the taxpayer.
The prudent business man often sets up reserves to cover con-
tingent liabilities. But they are not allowable as deductions. The
reserve set up by the Company was of that character. It cannot be
said that the loss actually paid by the Company in 1923 was, as a
matter of law or of undeniable fact sustained in 1919.279
In the Court's view "the mere fact that the exact amount of the liability
had not been definitely fixed in 1919 would not prevent the deduction,
as a loss of that year, of the amount later paid." That result did not
follow in the case under consideration, however, because here "[t]he
amount of the damages ... was wholly unpredictable." 2s 0
"'28o U.S. 445 (1930).
"Id. at 449, citing Weiss v. Wiener, 279 U.S. 333, 335 (1929) (a case in which
the taxpayer-lessee was denied a deduction for obsolescence of the lessor's property).




mid. at 450-51. See Burnet v. Huff, 288 U.S. 156 (1933) (relating to liability for
trust funds embezzled by a co-partner). In Huff it was stated that the "mere existence
of liability is not enough to establish a deductible loss." Id. at 16o. See Alison v.
United States, 344 U.S. 167 (1952), and INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 165(e). Difficulties
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Predictability, of course, supplied a proper test for accrual. But
while a taxpayer may not successfully allocate items to obviously im-
proper years by making or failing to make bookkeeping entries, ac-
counting records of public corporations reflecting carefully estimated
losses should ordinarily be conclusive. In cases similar to American
Code, the failure of the taxpayer to make a careful estimate of liability
and to record such estimate in its accounts should adequately demon-
strate, of itself, that either the item was unknown, perhaps because
not sufficiently mature to be taken seriously, or the amount was so un-
certain that a provision in the accounts was unwarranted. But the
language of the Court was couched in terms of legal standards rather
than accounting standards. Such accruals were permitted and required
only when (i) the liability was established, and (2) the amount of
liability was known or ascertainable with reasonable certainty.
The emphasis in American Code and in Ox Fibre on liability as an
element essential to the accrual of an expense was both unfortunate
and unnecessary. The need for annual returns adequately justified the
Court's refusal to reopen earlier years.28 ' Establishment of the liability
(or the right) of the taxpayer as a prerequisite to the accrual of an
expense (or income) invoked the application of standards devised for
purposes unrelated to the problem at hand, the computation of annual
income, and assured an inflexibility which could prevent both the
matching of expense with related income and the allocation of the re-
sults of that matching to the year earned. But with a busy Court, the
unfamiliar "scientific principles" of accounting, deemed decisive in
Anderson, could not easily compete with well-understood legal con-
cepts, such as unconditional liability, held to be controlling in Lucas v.
North Texas Co.282 In the latter case, the taxpayer owned timber lands
and on December 27, 1916, delivered a purchase option in respect of
its business properties. The holder of the option, solvent and fully able
to make the purchase, examined title on the same day, found it satis-
factory, and on December 3o, 1916, having arranged for funds to make
the purchase, notified the taxpayer that the option would be exercised.
On the same day, December 3o, 1916, the taxpayer "ceased operations
and withdrew all employees from the land." The closing of the trans-
of valuation were also stressed in United States v. Safety Car Heating & Lighting Co.,
297 U.S. 88, loo (1936), where a pre-1913 claim for patent infringement was not
settled until 1925: "The value of the claim in action, uncertain at the time of
settlement, was even more uncertain in February, 1913." No amount was excludable
in respect of March 1, 1913 value.
25 See, for example, Skelly Oil, supra, footnote 265.
"'281 U.S. i (1930).
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action was held on January 5, 1917. The taxpayer, which kept its books
on an accrual basis, recorded the gain from the transaction in its 1916
accounts. The Court held that income did not accrue as a result of the
executory contract of sale made on December 3o, 1916. The taxpayer
did not prepare the papers necessary to effect the transfer or
make tender of title or possession or demand the purchase price
in 1916. The title and right of possession remained in it until
the transaction was closed. Consequently, unconditional liability
of vendee for the purchase price was not created in that year.2 8 3
The Court said that the "entry of the purchase price" in the taxpayer's
accounts "as income in that year was not warranted," and that the
taxpayer "was not entitled to make return or have the tax computed
on that basis, as it clearly did not reflect 1916 income." 28 4
In North Texas, the Court ignored the taxpayer's books of account,
presumably closed in the usual manner, and decided that the question
of timing turned on legal formalities. 2s5 But the major activity of the
taxpayer which produced the gains in question occurred prior to 1917;
the taxpayer had closed down its operations and vacated the premises
in 1916, following notice of the exercise of the option, and the accrual
of the transaction in that year evidently seemed appropriate to the tax-
payer. A high degree of probability that the transaction would be con-
summated, rather than unconditional legal liability, should have suf-
ficed.286 The decision, if limited to capital assets, could provide, how-
ever, a degree of certainty, a guide useful in planning large transactions
where the matter of tax timing becomes important.28 7 Having given
public notice of the practice to be followed in similar situations, it may
1Id. at 11-12.
5Id. at 13-14. Although not referred to in Anderson, the Court in North Texas
noted the change in tax rates between 1916 and 1917. The War Revenue Act of
1917, ch. 63, §§ 4, 201, 40 Stat. 3oo, 302, 303, added 4% to the 2% rate of Section
io of the 1916 Act, plus an excess profits tax of as much as 6o%.
MAny requirement that those formalities must be completed before there can
be an accrual of income is obviously unsuited to the timing of numerous, day-to-day
transactions. As long as a system of cut-off accounting is consistently applied, the
distortion of annual income is minimized, regardless of which of a number of
related events is selected by the taxpayer to trigger the accrual.
-See I.T. 3485, 1941-1 Cuwa. BuLL. 240, where the Treasury ruled in connection
with the timing of the gain from the sale of securities that "with respect to a tax-
payer reporting on the accrual basis it appears correct to say that such gain is
returnable in the year in which the contract of sale was entered into and, therefore
the purchaser's legal obligation to make payment to the taxpayer became reason-
ably certain in fact and ascertainable in amount," citing Spring City and North
Texas!
2For the suggestion that a definite guide may provide a "blueprint for tax
avoidance," see Jordan Co. v. Allen, 85 F. Supp. 437, 444 (N.D. Ga. 1949).
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be assumed that properly advised taxpayers thereafter acted accord-
ingly.28
8
Having found a touchstone in unconditional liability, the Court,
as well as knowledgeable taxpayers, thereafter readily solved problems
of timing. The right of the taxpayer being assumed in Continental Tie
& Lumber Co. v. United States, 28 9 the accrual of estimated income was
said to be required, although essential administrative action had not
been taken to determine the amount of the accrual. In that case, the
taxpayer had a claim against the United States pursuant to Section 204
of the Transportation Act of 1920 2 90 (which provided for payments to
short line carriers not operated by the Government during World War
I, carriers assumed to have been injured as the result of the Govern-
ment's operation of larger railway systems). The amount of the claim
was to be determined by the 'Interstate Commerce Commission as pro-
vided in the Transportation Act and in accordance with the taxpayer's
accounts, kept as prescribed by the Commission, a determination which
"required in some degree the exercise [by the Commission] of opinion
and judgment." 291 Although that amount was not determined by the
Commission and was not paid by the Government until 1923, the
Court held the amount taxable in 192o, the year in which the "right
to the award was fixed by the passage of the Transportation Act. What
remained was mere administrative procedure to ascertain the amount to
be paid."292 In spite of "inherent difficulties [the Court thought] it was
28But see note 286 supra.
,1286 U.S. 290 (19s2).
21041 Stat. 460 (1920).
21186 U.S. at 296. That the amounts received from the Government represented
taxable income had been established on the same day in Texas & Pacific Railway
Co. v. United States, 286 U.S. 285 (1932). Section 209 of the Transportation Act of
192o guaranteed certain railroads a minimum operating income for a period of
six months after release from Government control, and the taxpayer claimed that
the amount received from the Government pursuant to the provisions of that
Section was a subsidy or gift and did not represent income within the meaning of
the sixteenth amendment or the 1918 Act. In declaring the payment taxable the
Court distinguished Cuba Railroad, note 13o supra, on the ground that the pay-
ments in that case were "conditioned upon construction work performed. Here
they were to be measured by a deficiency in operating income, and might -be used for
the payment of dividends, of operating expenses, or capital charges, or for any other
purpose within the corporate authority, just as any other operating revenue might
be applied." 286 U.S. 290. There was nothing in Cuba Railroad, however, to
indicate that the use of the cash received from the Cuban government was in any
manner restricted.
-12286 U.S. at 295.
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possible for a carrier to ascertain with reasonable accuracy the amount
of the award to be paid by the Government.
'293
Conversely, where the right of the taxpayer was in dispute, the tim-
ing of the accrual has seemed equally clear to the Court. In North
American Oil Consolidated v. Burnet,294 the taxpayer operated oil
properties claimed by the Government. Suit was instituted and a receiv-
er appointed on February 2, 1916. The district court dismissed the suit
in 1917 and the 1916 profits were paid over in 1917 by the receiver to the
taxpayer. The litigation was terminated in 192. "The income earned
from the property in 1916 had been entered on the books of the [tax-
payer] as its income. It had not been included in its original return of
income [for i9i6]," 205 apparently on the theory that the receiver, not
the taxpayer, was required by statute to report the income for tax pur-
poses.296 With strong overtones of cash basis accounting,297 the Court
held that the 1916 income was taxable in 1917, the year in which the
taxpayer "first became entitled to receive" and "actually received" the
money.
If a taxpayer receives earnings under a claim of right and with-
out restrictions as to its disposition, he has received income
which he is required to return, even though it may still be
claimed that he is not entitled to retain the money, and even
though he may still be adjudged liable to restore its equiva-
lent.2
98
The income earned in 1916 was not taxable in 1916 although included
in the taxpayer's accounts for that year, because the taxpayer "was not
required in 1916 to report as income an amount which it might never
receive." 2
99
-Id. at 297. But see United States Cartridge Co. v. United States, 284 U.S. 511
(193.) (inventories were not adjusted for subsequent payments from the Govern-
ment as compensation under cancelled war contracts. Such payments were held to
constitute income in the year the claims were allowed).
2286 U.S. 417 (1932).
md. at 421.
2OAct of Sept. 8, 1916, ch. 463, § i3(c), 39 Stat. 771. Section 13(c) required
receivers "who are operating the property or business of corporations" to make tax
returns. The Section was held inapplicable because the receiver was not the
receiver of all the taxpayer's property. 286 U.S. at 423.
m"Nor is it material, for the purposes of this case, whether the company's re-
turn was filled on the cash receipts and disbursements basis, or on the accrual basis."
.86 U.S. at 423.
mId. at 424. If repayment of the income had been required at the termination
of the litigation, the taxpayer "would have been entitled to a deduction from the
profits of 1922, not from those of any earlier year." Id. See also Healy v. Commis-
sioner, 345 U.S. 278 (1953).
M*286 U.S. at 4.23. See INT. REV. CODE Of 1954, § 1341, which provides for "claim
of right" tax relief where it is established that the taxpayer did not have an un-
restricted right to the item. See also INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 1342.
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In Spring City Foundry Co. v. Commissioner,300 it was certain that
the full amount of the item in question would never be received.
Nevertheless, the Court required the accrual of the entire amount be-
cause the taxpayer's (largely worthless) "right" was clear. The tax-
payer in 192o had sold goods on open account to a customer who be-
came bankrupt in that year. The taxpayer also in 1920 charged off on its
books the full amount of the account. Although uncollectible in part,30
the entire amount was held to be includable in current sales, and to be
reflected in 192o gross income, because "it is the right to receive and not
the actual receipt that determines the inclusion of an amount in gross
income. When the right to receive the amount becomes fixed, the right
accrues."30 2 Furthermore, there was not any deduction allowable. Pro-
visions in the 192o Act for (i) "losses sustained" and (2) "worthless"
debts3°3 were declared by the Court to be mutually exclusive, and the
claim against the bankrupt was not "worthless" in 1920.304 Undefined
gross income, therefore, was interpreted to include worthless or partly
worthless "rights" at face value. Appropriate deduction provisions, if
any, must be relied on to eliminate or reduce the effect of that inclu-
sion.
Even when dealing with the crude cash basis provisions of the 19o9
Act, the Court in Mitchell Brothers30 5 had recognized that Congress
intended to tax only "gain or increase," not gross receipts. A profitless
transaction was taxed in Sanford 6 Brooks,30 6 but that result was made
necessary by the requirements of annual accounting. In Spring City,
however, where (i) the taxpayer's sale and (2) the purchaser's bank-
ruptcy both took place in the same taxable year, the valuation of the
account receivable could not in any substantial manner prejudice an-
nual accounting procedures. On the contrary, that valuation was es-
sential to the proper determination of the taxpayer's 192o income.
Whether treated as an exclusion from gross income or as a deductible
loss, the choice was, as the Court had recognized in Mitchell Brothers,
"a mere question of methods, not affecting the result."307 Neither meth-
od, however, was now permitted by the Court in Spring City. Reverting
'292 U.s. 182 (1934).
-"'In later years the receiver distributed to the taxpayer assets aggregating 271/2%
of its claim.
"2 29 2 U.S. at 184-85.
"Act of Feb. .24, 1919, ch. 18 §§ 234(a)(4), (a)(5), 4o Stat. 1078.
"'292 U.S. at 189. It was not until 1921 that Congress provided for partly worth-
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to the practice followed in Stratton's Independence,30 the composite
character of income was again ignored; undefined gross income was
determined without regard to the availability of an appropriate de-
duction, and defined deductions were strictly construed. As a result,
loss transactions could be, and sometimes were, taxable as income.
The taxpayer had attempted the alternate routes of the exclusion
and the deduction approach in Brown v. Helvering,30 9 and had failed.
The commission income of the taxpayer, an insurance agent, in effect
was repaid by the taypayer when policies on which he had earned and
received commissions were thereafter cancelled. The returned commis-
sions, based on the taxpayer's experience, averaged between 20% and
25% of the amounts received. For the first time, in 1923 the taxpayer
claimed as an exclusion or as a deduction from gross income the esti-
mated amount which he anticipated would have to be eventually re-
funded with respect to commission received during the year. The ac-
counting treatment was disapproved by the Court which held that the
entire amount of the commissions received must be included in gross
income, the refund liability as to particular policies could not accrue
so long as it remained contingent, and the claimed exclusion or deduc-
tion was not allowable. The Court also concluded that it was within the
discretion of the Commissioner to require the taxpayer to follow his
earlier method of accounting, a method which had not provided for the
accrual of return commissions.
The taxpayer in Brown also attempted in 1923 to allocate to future
years a part of the 1923 commissions on the theory that he was under
an obligation to render future services in connection with the insurance
policies which had generated the commissions. The Board of Tax Ap-
peals had found no proof that the commissions were in any degree
compensation for future services, and since the Commissioner had wide
discretion regarding accounting methods, his rejection of the change
also was not disturbed by the Court.
In American National,3 10 the taxpayer had been permitted to accrue
and deduct estimated amounts payable pursuant to agreements with in-
vestors, but in Brown the taxpayer was not permitted to deduct esti-
mated amounts payable pursuant to agreements with insurance com-
panies. In each of those cases the contractual obligation to make pay-
"Note 46 supra.
"291 U. 193 1934).aONote 253 supra.
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ment was contingent upon decisions of third persons. 311 Although the
change in the taxpayer's accounting practice without the consent of the
Commissioner (with consequent doubling-up of more than one year's de-
ductions in the year of change), 312 may have justified the result in
Brown, the unfortunate reference to contingent liability added another
precedent to the growing list of decisions cited in support of the liabil-
ity theory of accrual.
Unconditional liability of another to the taxpayer as a test for
accrual of income was also applied by the Court to deductions. In
Dixie Pine Products Co. v. Commissioner=3 the taxpayer used a solvent
in its business which it claimed was not subject to the state gasoline tax.
After paying and deducting that tax in 1936, the taxpayer brought an
action in that year to enjoin future collections. A demurrer to the bill
of complaint was sustained by the lower court in 1936, but was reversed
and remanded on appeal in 1937. In 1938 the lower court perpetually
enjoined collection of the tax, and that decree was affirmed in 1939.
During 1937 local users of the solvent, with the exception of the tax-
payer and one other, had paid the assessed tax.31 4 Although the tax-
payer did not pay the gasoline tax in 1937, it accrued the asserted liabil-
ity in its books and deducted that amount in its 1937 return. The
Court disallowed the deduction because the liability had not "really"
accrued in 1937. It was "contingent" and "contested."
It has long been held that in order truly to reflect the income of
a given year, all the events must occur in that year which fix the
amount and the fact of the taxpayer's liability for items of in-
debtedness deducted though not paid .... 315
The taxpayer "might claim a deduction only for the taxable year in
which its liability for the tax was finally adjudicated."31
The same approach was taken in Security Flower Mills Co. v. Com-
missioner.317 The taxpayer accrued in 1935 and claimed as a deduction
for that year the processing tax315 on wheat processed in its mill during
mlin American National, liability ended to the extent the notes were curtailed
before maturity by the borrower; in Brown, liability ended upon the expiration of
the policy without cancellation by the insured.
ml.e., commissions received in earlier years, repaid during the current year,
plus estimated amounts credited to a (new) reserve for commissions currently re-
ceived but repayable in the future.
82o U.S. 516 (1944).
1445 B.T.A. 286, 287-88 (1941).
=32o U.S. at 519 (citing Anderson).
n632o U.S. at 519.
-"'321 U.S. 281 (1944)-
'wThe Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933 was declared unconstitutional in
United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936).
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the entire year. Earlier in 1935 a part of the 1935 processing tax had
been paid to the Collector, but suit was then instituted by the taxpayer
to enjoin future collection. A temporary injunction was obtained in
1935 on the condition that the processing tax be paid into a depository.
Although not stated as a separate item, the processing tax had been in-
cluded in the sales price of flour sold to customers. The Court disal-
lowed the deduction of all amounts not actually paid in 1935 to the
Collector, whether impounded or not, and also refused to permit the
taxpayer to exclude from gross income the tax collected from customers
as a part of the sales price,319 because the taxpayer had "received the
purchase price as such." That conclusion followed because the tax-
payer "denied liability for, and failed to pay, the tax during the taxable
year 1935, it was not in a position in its tax accounting to treat the
Government's claim as an accrued liability."3 20
Although the failure-to-pay language in Dixie Pine and Security
Mills suggested a contrary result, the Court in United States v. Con-
solidated Edison Co. of New York, Inc.321 held that an accrual basis
taxpayer contesting 15% of the tax demanded, but paying the entire
amount, could not deduct in the year paid that part of the real estate
taxes which it actively contested after payment.322 The Court viewed
the payment as a "mere deposit." 323 The Court's decision that pay-
ment by an accrual taxpayer, in and of itself, should not determine the
timing of a tax deduction is obviously sound. But the Court's holding
that the disputed amounts were not deductible until the controversy
was settled does not follow as a necessary conclusion.
Property taxes, generally attributable to specific periods of time, are
customarily allocated to the business activities of those periods. Esti-
mated amounts reasonably accrued in the books of the taxpayer for the
appropriate tax year should be deductible, whether paid or not, or
whether in dispute or not. Anderson decided that uncertainty as to
amount of liability was not controlling, but proper matching of revenue
and expense was. The fact of litigation should not defer the deduc-
tion of the amount of a tax accrued for other corporate purposes, for
example, rate making, reports to shareholders, etc., any more than the
amount of disputed munitions tax involved in the returns in Anderson
deferred the deductions in that case. While the formal character of the
wVarious amounts had been repaid to customers in 1936, 1937 and 1938.
M°321 U.S. at 284.
=a366 U.S. 38o (1961).
"-But see INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 461(f) (now permitting the deduction of
amounts paid in respect of contested items otherwise deductible).
'2366 U.S. at 391.
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dispute in Anderson was not the same as that in Consolidated Edison,
the threat of liability was as serious and as successful in ripening into
actual liability in the former case as in the latter.
Unanticipated subsequent demands upon the taxpayer for the
payment of additional items for prior years present somewhat different
problems. Reopening the returns of an earlier year would be theoretic-
ally correct, as the Commissioner had contended in another connection
in Ox Fibre, but practical necessity, recognized in Sanford & Brooks,
dictates otherwise. As should be true of losses, the accrual of any other
expense of doing business should be based on a reasonable estimate
of the certainty of the event. Book recognition or non-recognition of the
item, unless obviously an improper exercise of business judgment,
should be determinative. As early as 1917 the Treasury had provided
for the deduction of amounts credited to reserves "to meet liabilities,
the amount of which and the date of payment or maturity of which is
definitely not determined or determinable at the time liability is in-
curred." 324 Accepting the illustration used by the Court to decide Con-
solidated Edison, 95% of the property tax demanded by the local
government in that case was ultimately determined to be payable and
was paid. To allow the accrual for tax purposes of an amount demanded
by the taxing authority, when such additional amount is reasonably
recorded as an expense in the taxpayer's accounts, appears to be well
within the tolerance permitted for estimating tax deductions, 325 as the
facts in Anderson clearly demonstrated.326
Furthermore, the distinction, as such, between uncertainty as to
the amount of liability and uncertainty as to whether the contestant is
subject to the liability, is an exceedingly doubtful one and was properly
disregarded in Consolidated Edison. In Dixie Pine and in Security
Mills, the threat of liability was not frivolous; it was sufficiently seri-
ous to induce actual payment after initial enactment, and competitors
continued to pay such items although the validity of the local law giv-
ing rise to the item had been challenged and was being litigated. In
both cases the amounts in question were reasonably certain and were
reflected in the accounts of the taxpayers. The cases were, therefore,
unlike American Code in which the amount of damages was said to be
"wholly unpredictable." To allow the current deduction of items in dis-
pute under circumstances similar to those illustrated by Dixie Pine, Se-
3"T.D. 2433, ig TREAS. DEC. INT. REv. 5 (1917).
-"Taxable income shall be computed under the method of accounting on the
basis of which the taxpayer regularly computes his income in keeping his books."
INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 446; see Treas. Reg. § 1.446-i(a) (1961).
-"Notes 244-45 supra.
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curity Mills and Consolidated Edison would not appear to offer a
threat to federal revenue, regardless of whether the dispute is centered
around the subject of the tax, its constitutionality, or the proper
amount payable. The fact that a matter is in controversy, whether liti-
gated or not, should certainly be one important element to be consider-
ed in determining the reasonableness of the accrual, and the amount
accrued, but not determinative. Controversy, in and of itself, should
not bar the accrual. The Court in Consolidated Edison, however, held
otherwise. In reaching that result, the Court treated the contest as to
amount as being essentially a contest as to underlying liability. Conse-
quently, the contested amount was held to be deductible only in the
year of entry of the final court order determining liability. Just as the
chance timing of a cash payment or a cash receipt may have little signi-
ficance in the proper accrual of revenue and expense for income deter-
mination purposes, the culmination of events establishing uncondi-
tional liability may be equally irrelevant. Each test contains the same
basic flaw: Neither a cash transaction nor a liability (or right) deter-
mination bears any necessary relation to the amount of income earned
during the year, or to the expenses attributable to the earnings of that
period.3 27 Indeed, from one important point of view, a modified system
of cash accounting which includes inventories is to be preferred. The
cash flow, at least, does have a measurable and immediate economic im-
pact upon the current business affairs of the taxpayer.3 28
Although the Court in Consolidated Edison gave conclusive effect
to the fact of local litigation, it rejected cash accounting concepts with
respect to the accrual of a deduction. Payment prior to the end of the
local dispute did not accelerate the accrual of the expense in that case
and, hopefully, receipt of prepaid revenue will ultimately not neces-
sarily result in the immediate accrual of income. In North American
Oil,329 the receivership, not the litigation, postponed the accrual of in-
come. Transactions relating to the property in dispute during the year
327Postponing the accrual of the contested amounts in Consolidated Edison had
the effect of overestimating income in low tax rate years, and of transferring the
deduction relating to those early years to World War II income and excess profits
tax years. Excessive rigidity in dealing with deductions was also illustrated in
Magruder v. Supplee, 316 U.S. 394 (1942), where the Court refused to permit a
reasonable apportionment of property taxes between the buyer and seller of real
estate. Legislative (state and local) notions of "tax day," determined by technical
and frequently obscure factors, were substituted for generally accepted settlement
practice. The substitution, however, was only temporary. Congress reversed Supplee
in important respects to permit apportionment between buyer and seller. See INT.
REV. CODE Of 1954 § 64(d).
3'See note 322 supra for an indication of the congressional point of view,
mNote 294 supra.
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in question, notwithstanding the receivership, were recorded in the
books of the taxpayer, and concepts such as "all events" and "claim of
right" undoubtedly were ignored by the taxpayer in following its nor-
mal accounting procedures. The taxpayer's income tax return for 1916,
but for its mistaken view that the receiver was required to file a return,
presumably would have included the income in question. The basic
consideration, therefore, was whether the receivership indicated a prob-
able loss of the oil rights, so that the inclusion of the disputed income
in the records of the taxpayer was without justification, or whether the
receivership was merely perfunctory. The latter appears to have been
the view of the taxpayer in keeping the business records and that eval-
uation, unless shown to be specious, should have been conclusive as to
the year of accrual. If the threatened loss resulting from the litigation
justified the Commissioner's postponement of the accrual, the accrual
should have been timed to the removal of that threat, not by the pay-
ment of funds held by the receiver; accordingly, the removal of the
serious threat of loss may have been the real, even though unexpressed,
reason which justified the conclusion reached by the Court, but un-
happily, that was not the reason stated. The opinion was constructed
in terms reflecting a concept akin to cash basis accounting.
In Brown, as in Stratton's Independence and in North American
Oil, the Court again refused to explore the valuation aspects of the
problem under consideration. Putting to one side the change in ac-
counting present in Brown, income from commissions received during
the year should have been accrued and taxed only to the extent re-
tention was not measurably threatened by his contractual obligations
(liability) to make repayments. The taxpayer's experience had indicated
a range within which such payments probably would be made, and at
least the minimum anticipation of repayment should have been allowed
by the Court. Whether such allowance should take the form of an exclu-
sion from gross receipts or the form of a deduction from gross income,
it was "a mere question of methods, not affecting the result."3 30
North American Oil dealt with the receipt of income earned in an
earlier year. Brown dealt with receipts subject to repayment. The basic
problem was evaluation. When dealing with prepaid revenue, however,
the problem becomes essentially one of timing. In Gauley Mountain
the Court had approved the allocation of income between (1) taxable
years and (2) prior, tax-free years on the basis of daily averages when
more accurate information was not available.33' A similar allocation of
3'OText accompanying note 75 supra.
InText accompanying notes 76-82 supra.
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prepaid receipts would appear to be equally reasonable. But in Auto-
mobile Club of Michigan v. Commissioner,332 the distribution of pre-
paid membership dues over the life of the membership agreement was
said to be "purely artificial" and bearing "no relation to the services
which [the taxpayer] may in fact be called upon to render for [a] mem-
ber."3 33 In a similar case, American Automobile Association v. United
States,334 the taxpayer's accounting system, "substantially identical"
with that used in Michigan, was supported by "expert accounting testi-
mony indicating that the system used was in accord with generally ac-
cepted accounting principles; that its proof of cost of member service
was detailed; and that the correlation between that cost and the period
of time over which the dues were credited as income was shown and
justified by proof of experience."335 Nevertheless, the allocation to fu-
ture years was disapproved,33 6 the Court somewhat illogically conclud-
ing that the federal revenue cannot be made "to depend upon average
experience in rendering performance and turning a profit."337 Quite to
353 U.S. 18o (1957) (Justices Burton, Clark and Harlan dissented). Earlier in
Old Colony Railroad Co. v. Commissioner, 284 US. 552 (1932), the Court had held
that the premium received on bonds sold before March x, 1913, was income in the
year received, not a deferred credit to be written off over the life of the bond or a
reduction in the amount of nominal interest currently payable. But in Helvering
v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 293 U.S. 282 (1934), the Court held that discount on
bonds sold before March 1, 1913, could be written off as a deduction over the life
of the pre-March i bonds. See Treas. Reg. § 1.61-12(c)(2) (1957), relating to bonds
issued at a premium after February 28, 1913, and Treas. Reg. 1.61-12(c)(3) (1957),
relating to bonds issued at a discount. See also Great Western Power Co. v. Com-
missioner, 297 U.S. 543 (1936); Helvering v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 306 U.S. 522
(1939).
-353 U.S. at 189.
The Commissioner determined that the [taxpayer] received the pre-
paid dues under a claim of right, without restriction as to their dis-
position, and therefore the entire amount received in each year
should be reported as income. The Commissioner relies upon North
American Oil .... We cannot say, in the circumstances here, that
the discretionary action of the Commissioner ... exceed[s] per-
missible limits.
Id. at 188-9o.
23367 U.S. 687 (1961). See also Commissioner v. Milwaukee & Suburban Trans-
port Corporation, 367 U.S. 9o6 (1961).
5367 U.S. at 691. The Court relied heavily on the repeal by Congress of Sections
452 and 462 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, which had expressly permitted the
deferring of income and the accruing of anticipated expenses, respectively, and on
the enactment of Section 455 of the Code which permitted publishers to defer pre-
paid subscriptions. Act of June 15, 1955, ch. 143, 69 Stat. 134.
3'Justices Douglas, Harlan, Whittaker and Stewart dissented.
3367 U.S. at 693. Relief, however, was provided immediately thereafter by
Congress. See INT. R v. CODE of 1954, § 456. See also INT. REV. CODE of 1954 § 455
(permitting publishers to defer prepaid subscriptions).
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the contrary, profits were taxed on an average daily basis in Gauley
Mountain, and important expenses, such as depreciation and interest,
are frequently computed in a similar manner, of necessity.
The practice of allocating revenue over the life of membership con-
tracts, disapproved in Michigan and American, was not a factor in
Schlude v. Commissioner.338 In the latter case the prepaid fees from
dance studio contracts had been deferred by the taxpayer and later
taken to income on the basis of hours actually taught in the perform-
ance of the contracts. 339 That practice was also disapproved by the
Court. Customer's decisions concerning the time for taking lessons,
rather than averages became the evil which destroyed the taxpayer's
method of deferring income. The Court said that the services "were
rendered solely on demand in the fashion of [Michigan and American]
.... Consequently the Commissioner was fully justified in including
payments in cash or negotiable notes340 in gross income for the year in
which such payments were received... [T]he contract installments are
likewise includable in gross income ... for the year they become due
and payable. For the accrual basis taxpayer 'it is the right to receive and
not the actual receipt that determines the inclusion of the amount in
gross income.' "341
Beginning with the decision of the second issue in Brown, where
the postponement of the accrual of income was denied because the tax-
payer failed to establish a relationship between the receipt of over-
riding commissions and a contractual obligation to supply future serv-
ices, and by perpetuation in Schlude, where both the relationships and
the timing were clearly shown, the Court has refused to allow the de-
ferral to future years of amounts actually received for future services, 3 42
38372 U.S. 128 (1963). Justices Douglas, Harlan, Stewart and Goldberg dissented.
'"Accounts inactive for more than a year were also closed into income. Id. at 132.
"O"Negotiable notes are regarded as the equivalent of cash receipts, -to the extent
of their fair market value, for the purposes of recognition of income." Id. at 136,
n.lo.
3id. at 137, citing Spring City v. Commissioner, 292 U.S. 182, 184 (1934). The
Commissioner conceded that "future payments which were not evidenced by a note
and which were neither due by -the terms of the contract nor matured by perfom-
ance of the related services" were not includable in gross income. 372 U-S. at 133.
The Court noted that "percentage royalties" and "sales commissions for lessons
sold" were deducted in the year paid, rather than being postponed with the related
items of revenue. Id. at 136. The Court also noted that Congress had enacted a
relief provision applicable to certain membership organizations, permitting the
deferring of revenue, and thereby had indicated a "policy of treating this problem
by precise provisions of narrow applicability." Id. at 135. See note 337 supra.
84But see Hagen Advertising Displays, Inc. v. Commissioner, 407 F.2d 1105
(6th Cir. 1969) (suggesting that where amounts have been received in prepayment
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even though such amounts are readily analogous to "deposits" properly
recognized in Consolidated Edison as a neutral factor in the timing
of an accrual. In addition, the Court in Schlude held that amounts not
actually received for services to be performed in the future, if due and
payable, were "likewise includable in gross income." Thus both the
"all events" items (due and payable) and the "claim of right" items were
currently taxable even though substantial performance remained to be
completed under outstanding contracts. In light of that startling con-
clusion, and in view of the great number and variety of early-pay
agreements currently being used, a heavy burden is placed on the self-
assessment process by Supreme Court-made accounting theory. Indeed,
Treasury understandably is in the process of modifying Schlude and
related cases. 343 Accrual basis taxpayers may defer (within prescribed
limits) payments received for future services to be performed not later
than the year following the year of receipt 344 and proposed regulations
would permit accrual basis taxpayers to defer certain prepayments for
goods to be sold in the future.345
In Commissioner v. Hansen,3 46 valuation problems were again dis-
regarded, as they had been in American National. In Hansen sales by
automobile and house trailer dealers were made on credit (one to five
years) secured by the respective vehicles sold. Installment paper ob-
tained by the dealer from a purchaser, usually guaranteed by the dealer,
was discounted under an agreement whereby a percentage (5% to lo%)
of the discount price was retained by the finance company or bank to
secure dealer performance. The Court, ignoring problems of valuation,
held that the full amount of the discount price must be included in the
gross income of an accrual basis dealer in the year the installment paper
was discounted,347 even though (i) it must have been apparent that a
stated amount payable in the future ordinarily does not have the value
of an immediate payment of the same amount3 48 and (2) the generally
accepted rule requires that property received in a taxable exchange
must be reported as income on the basis of fair market value. That rule
for goods to be sold in the future, at least the cost of goods sold, representing
capital, should be excluded from current taxable income). See notes 343, 344 and
345 infra.
asSee I.R.S. News Release No. 1055 (August 6, 1970).
2"Technical Information Release No. 1o4o (August 6, 1970).
20Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1451-5. See also note 342 supra.
86o U.S. 446 (1959).
12 Trransitional relief was afforded dealers by the Dealer Reserve Income Act of
igo. Pub. L. No. 86-459, 74 Stat. 124.3-Note 258 supra.
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is applied without question to the receipt of negotiable notes349 and
should, a fortiori, be applied to non-negotiable obligations.
Cases such as American Nationa35 o and Hansen,51 therefore, amply
illustrate the need for the use of valuation procedures in the solution
of tax accounting problems heretofore decided by the Court on an
all-or-nothing basis. Recent lower court decisions emphasize the im-
portance of that need. For example, in Mooney Aircraft, Inc. v. United
States352 the taxpayer, with each aircraft manufactured and sold, issued
a "Mooney Bond," representing an unconditional obligation to pay
bearer $iooo upon the retirement of the aircraft from service. The tax-
payer sought to exclude or deduct the principal amount of the bond
from gross income in the year issued. Although the obligation was in
effect a reduction in the sales price of the airplane,353 the Commis-
sioner disallowed the deduction, contending that it was allowable only
in the year in which the aircraft was in fact retired. In sustaining the
Commissioner the Court of Appeals relied heavily upon the Commis-
sioner's statutory authority to require a taxpayer to use a method of
accounting which clearly reflected income.3 54 Although the full amount
of the deduction claimed by the taxpayer was properly disallowed, the
case ought to have been remanded to the trial court for determination
of the market value, if any, of the "Mooney Bond." To the extent that
the taxpayer can establish the present market value, that amount should
either be excluded from sales revenue or deducted from gross income
and the difference between the present market value and the principal
amount of the bond should be deducted ratably over the estimated
life of the aircraft. 55
249See, e.g., note 340 supra.
mNote 253 supra.
-'Note 346 supra.
35242o F.2d 4oo (5th Cir. 1969).
35Or, alternatively, the taxpayer sold an airplane and a bond and the amount
received (or receivable) should be allocated between the two.
n'
4
INT. RFEV. CODE Of 1954, § 446(b).
3r5See also Lukens Steel Company, 52 T.C. 764 (1969). That case involved the
accrual (on the basis of current payroll hours) of unemployment benefits expense to
be paid (pursuant to the requirements of a collective bargaining agreement) in the
indefinite future, the accrual formula having been devised by "a group of experts
on economics and statistics selected by the steel companies and the union." Id. at
778. The liability was unconditional, and the amount was readily determinable by
use of the formula and the expense, in large part at least, was clearly attributable
to current operations. Unemployment benefits were an immediate cost of producing
steel, not a future cost of non-production. Required by -the Union contract, the
present value of the hourly incurred liability was as much a current cost of labor
as take-home pay. To the extent that the accrual did not exceed the cost of
acquiring from independent underwriters insurance providing equivalent future
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The Court in Mitchell Brothers, decided after the early depletion
cases, recognized congressional intent to tax on the basis of "gain or
increase." Nevertheless, when faced with valuation problems necessary
to the determination of "gain or increase," the Court has been reluctant
to consider matters of degree. Profitless accruals were fully taxable in
Spring City. Depletion costs were disallowed in Stratton's Independence
and related cases. Deferred receipts were fully taxable in Hansen, as
were the returnable receipts in Brown. If the Court does continue to in-
sist on the immediate tax accrual of the full amount of a receivable
which is not to be collected until the distant future, as suggested by
Hansen, it should find it difficult to justify the complete disallowance
of a business expense, unconditional and fixed in amount, although
payable in the distant future.3 5 6
As emphasized in Anderson, accrual accounting is based on the
premise that income earned during the taxable year must be charged
with expenses incurred in producing that income. The process of match-
ing revenue and expense should not be distorted by the frequently ac-
benefits, such cost was properly allowed by the Tax Court in the year accrued by
the taxpayer. In addition to the increased hourly cost for current wages, the agree-
ment with the Union also required the taxpayer to assume unconditionally the
amount of contingent unemployment benefit liability which had accumulated under
an earlier wage agreement. Subject to similar discount adjustments, if any, applicable
to the current unemployment benefit costs, the expense so incurred was also properly
deducted in the year the liability became unconditional. Although applicable to
past services, the amount was not allowable for the year the work was performed,
in view of Ox Fibre and Sanford & Brooks. Any excess amount accrued (assuming
the reasonableness of the benefits, an assumption readily made, in view of the
bargaining which gave rise to the obligation) should be deferred and written off
in some appropriate manner.
Washington Post Co. v. United States, 405 F.2d 1279 (Ct. CL. 1969), presented a
somewhat different situation. In that case the taxpayer accrued irrevocable obliga-
tions to pay its independent circulation dealers under specified conditions at de-
terminable but uncertain future dates the amounts so accrued, a purpose of the
plan being "to maintain a continuing relationship" between the taxpayer and the
dealers "over a period of years." 405 F.2d at 1281. The allocation of the accrued
cost of the "continuing relationship" to appropriate years was not necessary, be-
cause Section 173 of the current Internal Revenue Code provided that "expendi-
tures ... to establish, maintain, or increase the circulation of a newspaper ... shall
be allowed as a deduction." And the Regulations helpfully provided (i) that the
deduction "shall be allowed only for the taxable year in which such expenditures
are paid or incurred," Section 1.173-1(a)(3), and (2) that under the accrual method
of accounting "an expense is deductible for the taxable year in which all the events
have occurred which determine the fact of the liability and the amount thereof can
be determined with reasonable accuracy." Section i.46i-i(a)(2). The fact and
amount of liability being clear, questions of valuation and of matching expense
with related revenue were not considered. The Code and Regulations made those
questions irrelevant.
3See notes 352 and 355 supra.
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cidental timing of the cash flow or by requiring the technical ripening
of unconditional claims and liabilities. And preliminary to that match-
ing is the valuation of the items under consideration, a matter of esti-
mate measured by experience and reasonable judgment.
Unfortunately, the attainment of needed correction under a gov-
ernment of separation of powers is slow and uncertain. The formulation
of a concept of business income which will operate fairly when applied
to widely diversified activity, as a practical matter rather than a theoreti-
cal matter, is an enormously difficult task. Conflicting points of view
and uncoordinated decisions of the legislative, executive and judicial
branches of government, compounded by taxpayer demands for pre-
ferred consideration have produced illogical rules which, if actually
followed, could and frequently do result in determinations of income
widely at variance with the official records of the corporate taxpayer 3r7
and with generally accepted concepts of income.
Basically the responsibility for raising revenue is legislative and
executive rather than judicial. While obviously necessary and desirable
as a means of settling non-accounting disputes between the taxpayer
and the tax collector, the Supreme Court does not have the facilities
for and should not be charged with the duty of defining a general con-
cept of business income and should not have been permitted, by de-
fault, to establish basic (tax) accounting rules to be followed in com-
puting the income so defined. The initial failure of Congress to enact
a workable income tax law together with the consequent preemption
by the Supreme Court of the responsibility for formulating principles
of accrual, and the harmful effect of remedial legislation enacted to
modify those principles by affording special relief to limited groups of
favored taxpayers is responsible for much of the complexity and most
of the unfairness of the present Internal Revenue Code provisions
dealing with the determination of annual taxable income.
w'Treasury took an encouraging step forward in § 3.09 of Technical Release
No. o4o, note 344 supra, dealing with prepaid income received for the perform-
ance of the future services when it required that
The amount of any advance payment includible in the taxable year
of receipt under the foregoing rules shall be no less than the
amount of such payment included for purposes of all reports (in-
cluding consolidated financial statements) to shareholders, partners,
other proprietors, beneficiaries, and for credit purposes.
Congress earlier had taken a similar position with respect to the use of the "lifo"
method of inventorying goods. See INT. Rxv. CODE of 1954, § 472(c). Hopefully, the
requirement will be extended to other and more important areas.
